

Marine Corps

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Gazette



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THIS MONTH'S COVER by MSgt John DeGrasse

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Caterpillar DW20 Tractor with No. 456 LOWBOWL Scraper is pushloaded by a D9 Tractor equipped with a pushcup. With eight other DW20s it is working on construction of runways, taxiways and other facilities at


Bergstrom Air Force Base, near Austin, Texas. Altogether, the fast-moving DW20s are getting up to 20,500 cu. yd. in a 20-hour working day on hauls of 1 to 2½ miles round trip.

Job report on Bergstrom A.F.B. construction

Near Austin, Texas, the H. B. Zachry Company is building runways, taxiways and other facilities for the new Bergstrom Air Force Base. This is a big operation—2,370,000 cu. yd. of excavation. In addition, it calls for 300,000 yd. of select base material and 503,000 yd. of concrete pavement. Runways are 12,250 ft. long, 300 ft. wide.

Work started in April, 1957, and is being handled by nine Caterpillar DW20 Tractors with No. 456

Caterpillar D8 Tractor pulling a disk harrow and a D8 pulling a sheepfoot roller are among the many pieces of Caterpillar-built equipment working on runway construction. The D8s feature dependable Cat Engines, operator-convenient, power-boosted controls and built-in quality for long life.



LOWBOWL Scrapers, two Cat D9 Tractors, six D8s, two D7s and seven No. 12 Motor Graders.

The DW20s are getting up to 20,500 cu. yd. in a 20-hour working day. Rough material, too—clay, limestone conglomerate, shale and black gumbo. Round-trip hauls have varied from 1 to 2½ miles.

Powered by a Cat Diesel Engine, the four-wheel DW20-No. 456 rig has the power and stability for big-volume hauling at high speeds. It's rated at 18 cu. yd. struck, 25 heaped. Ten-speed transmission offers a selection of speeds to handle any job. Easy to see why the Caterpillar DW20-No. 456 wheel unit has a proved economy record!

Caterpillar Tractor Co., Peoria, Illinois, U. S. A.

CATERPILLAR

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**WANTED—
THE HARD WORK**



Command . . .

. . . Colonel Frederick P. Henderson's excellent article "The Return of the Man on Horseback" (GAZETTE: June '58) should cause all officers to give thought to the implied indictment contained therein. Many a commander, at all levels, I am sure, has unwittingly relegated himself to the status of a concurring authority rather than an issuing authority merely through allowing his staff to do all of the work and all of the supervising.

Perceptive thought on this problem will cause many officers to consider our basic dispersion concept and the responsibility it will impose upon the individual commander, to make decisions which will effect the life or death of his command. Here, I think, is where we shall separate the "men from the boys," for here it is that the weak commander will take refuge in the evaluated, weighed, considered and above all safe opinion of his staff, which avoids the daring, the calculated risk, the great gamble to win all. The strong commander will listen to the information his staff has procured and will make *his* decision right or wrong, it will be his decision. One thing that I think is almost as important, *he* will issue the order, rather than a parade of staff officers.

During the past 20 years, there has been a growing tendency in the Marine Corps, as in the other services, to consider a tactical error made in a FEX, or other training maneuver as an unpardonable offense, a crime in the same status as original sin. The ultimate, a tactical error in combat has its own particular punishment and we use this as a "Sword of Damocles" to hang over the heads of our junior officers. Exercises and

maneuvers are times for the making and correction of errors, where new equipment, tactics and techniques should be tried and evaluated. I submit that officers maturing in age and seniority under the conditions described have unwittingly thrust us into a position where the commanders of today are subconsciously afraid to trust their own opinion. As evidence of this I am sure that all of us have, at one time or another, attended a critique of the "rubber stamp" variety, where every one, in turn, tells the assembled group of officers what a fine job they did, with not a mention of the errors or the rough spots in the conduct of the exercises. No one profits by this. No vistas are opened, imaginations are not fired with the possibilities of what could have been, and to all intents and purposes it has been wasted time.

I personally agree with Col Henderson that it is high time to trade the field desk for the boot jack; to figuratively mount our horse and ride with the shades of "Stonewall" Jackson, "Jeb" Stuart and the other great leaders, who found command the greatest challenge of their lives.

Maj R. J. McGlynn

NROTC Unit
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Ind.

The August issue, page 64, contained a typographical error. Under the listing of classifications for the 1958 Essay Contest, Group numbers were transposed. See back cover of this issue for correct Group classifications.

Ed.

Partisan or Irregular?

. . . I found Maj A. H. Sollom's article "Nowhere Yet Everywhere" (GAZETTE: June '58) both enjoyable and informative. But while instructing in this subject on the rifle company level I have found it important to stress the difference between Partisan and Irregular. Maj Sollom keeps referring to Partisan as "a civilian who has taken up arms." According to Webster, and I quote:

"Partisan: Any member of a body of detached, light troops engaged in harassing the enemy.

"Irregular: Not belonging to the regular army organization, but raised for a specific service, (i.e. guerilla type warfare)."

All of the current FM's and other official publications seem to uphold Webster's definition.

1st Lt J. F. Cody, Jr.

2d Bn 4th Mar
1st Mar Brig, FMF
FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

Paper Shufflers

. . . Refer to July 1958 issue of the GAZETTE and the article "Reorganization between the Margins" by Lt Col L. E. Hudgins, Jr.

This article is worthy of reproduction and distribution to everyone in the administrative field. Lt Col Hudgins should be complimented on bringing to the attention of all Marines this vital and impressive message.

Certainly anyone in the service who has to shuffle papers will appreciate knowing that Lt Col Hudgins has finally cracked the ice.

SSgt R. A. Long


OSO, New Custom House
Philadelphia, Penn.

Family Talk

. . . 1st Lt D. L. Young has written one of the most interesting letters (GAZETTE: June '58) that it has been my pleasure to see in the GAZETTE in many months. The first few paragraphs of the Lt's letter may well be considered "Family Talk." I for one surely hope that it is not true that such pessimism has reached rank and file in the Corps; I know that it has not reached my small segment.

(Continued on page 4)

★
The GAZETTE will pay \$5.00 for each letter published in Message Center
★



Clifton W. Phalen, left, Executive Vice President, American Telephone and Telegraph Company, accepted the Citation for the Bell System. On the right is Brigadier General de Lesseps S. Morrison, USAR, National President, Reserve Officers Assn.

ROA Cites Bell System for Defense Work

On June 27th of this year the Reserve Officers Association of the United States awarded its Distinguished Service Citation to the Bell Telephone System. It was the first time that an industrial organization had ever received the award.

The Citation notes that the Bell System has established "the concept of national defense as a primary function of the nationwide communications service in which it is engaged," and that it makes its resources "available to civilian and military services at an instant's notice."

Among the defense projects which Bell System companies have worked on in recent years

are the DEW line; the submarine cable system for the Caribbean missile testing range; "White Alice," an all-weather military communications system for Alaska; SAGE, the semi-automatic air warning system; the design and development of various atomic weapons; and work on guidance systems for the Thor, Titan and Nike missiles. In addition, Bell System personnel work closely with local Civil Defense agencies throughout the country.

The men and women of the Bell System are proud of this award, and proud, too, to be of service to the nation.

BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM



(Continued from page 2)

From about the third paragraph on, the Lt has struck vital points that this Old Recruiter in the Field has used and will continue to use, as a method of selling the USMC to young Americans. I especially like his reference to the third day of any future war, and his reference to the utter futility of Air Organizations to conquer well trained and established infantry units. The ability of the Marine Corps to absorb punishment, and to return fighting is something that we must never forget; and we must begin to sell that attitude at the Recruiting Sub Station level.

TSgt G. D. Brown

USMC—RSS
Pocatello, Idaho

Cpls Are NCOs

... I have just finished reading Capt McMichael's very fine article entitled "Basic Training—A New Approach" (GAZETTE: July '58) which is excellent food for thought and evidently much effort has been made by the author to present a difficult subject in a clear and thought-provoking manner. He certainly is to be congratulated for stimulating many of us on this important subject.

There is one statement mentioned with which I cannot agree, however, and that is about the corporals becoming so numerous that "it is not uncommon to find them standing guard as a sentry, or even serving as a messman." I do not know exactly what Capt MacMichael bases that statement on but as one officer who has been around the Corps for awhile I have never seen a corporal standing mess duty. Only at Naval Bases, Guard Detachments and Ships Detachments have I ever seen a corporal standing guard duty as a sentry. Certainly it is not done, to the best of my knowledge, in the FMF. Please, Captain, don't start spreading that rumor. A corporal is an NCO according to the concept of the US Marine Corps and will be for a long time to come.

Capt J. W. Duncan

89th Inf Co, USMCR
Columbia, S. C.

Just Another Billet?


... This is in reference to BGen Masters' article, "Minimizing Uncertainty" (GAZETTE: June '58).

Intelligence in the Marine Corps

has been and will remain, in the eyes of some commanders just another billet that can be filled with any officer.

Until unit commanders realize that their Intelligence Officer is a very vital member of their staff, Intelligence training in the Marine Corps will continue to be disregarded.

As an example, while serving as section chief in an Inf Bn, the S-2 had the additional duties of Fire Marshal; Mess Officer; Trial Council; Recruiting Officer; Member, Recreation Council; Member, NCO Promotion Board and Executive Officer, H&S Company. By taking just one additional duty, Trial Council, we can see how much time was left for Intelligence training.



In addition, the S-2 must be on an equal basis with the Operations Officer, i.e.: rank and experience. Too many times, Intelligence sections have been utilized as "Number 1 Boys" for the Operations section due to the S-2 being a 1st or 2d Lt.

Let's hope that unit commanders referred to will take heed.

TSgt G. Le Veque

MARTD, MARTC, NAS
Minneapolis 50, Minn.

Recon Fires Expert

... In regard to the letter from Capt H. E. McKinney in the May GAZETTE concerning "Kentucky Tank Crewmen."

I believe all who have fired the M3A1 Sub-machine Gun have had the same complaint about the odd aiming points that have been used in the past.

However, the statement at the end of the article "The highest I've seen is a low sharpshooter!", needs additional comment before people gain the wrong impression of a very fine weapon for close combat purposes.

Some of our Marines can and do fire expert with the M3A1 Sub-machine Gun. In April and May of 1958 part of the 1st ReconBn, 1st

MarDiv (Reinf), FMF qualified with this weapon. The chart below will give some idea of its effectiveness in firing over the same course.

ORG	FIRED	EX	SS	MM	UNQ
Co A	28	2	5	17	4
Co B	43	10	7	21	5
Co C	38	8	8	19	3
Total	109	20	20	57	12

In addition to the 89 per cent qualification so far in the Battalion, 18 per cent were experts, 18 per cent were sharpshooters.

To top off the 200 yard line firing, one of the platoon leaders, to check the accuracy of the weapon, fired a 10 round magazine fully automatic at the target and scored 10 hits of 10 shots fired.

Perhaps Capt McKinney has been watching the wrong people shoot!

Capt F. D. MacLean, Jr.

1st Recon Bn
1st MarDiv, FMF
Camp Pendleton, Calif.

For The New Drill

... This dipsy-do concerning LPM versus New Drill shouldn't be labored upon until it reaches ludicrous heights whereby every Marine contributes his own viewpoint on the controversy, but inconsistencies have cropped up that run counter to the very basis of our Marine Corps training and objectives.

In his recent article on this "hot stove league" squabble throughout the Corps, SSgt Alvarez pointed out the fact that a recruit or any beginner exposed to learning New Drill may find himself in a certain position one day and shortly thereafter may be pressed into service in another capacity. He further states that this shifting of positions necessitates the process of learning to start over again, and that mental alertness suffers, with the end result that "smartness and precision are lost."

To these and other reasons offered by the loyal opposition, I say in retort that drill, and specifically New Drill, complements combat training. It is readily admitted that the prestige of the NCO ranks is in need of a swift renaissance. Next to field work, what better channel exists that gives NCO's a chance to develop command presence and issue orders following a chain of command, than the drill field! This takes on more clarified meaning and affords greater

(Continued on page 6)

AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS



FIRE FIGHTING S-58—Approaching a blazing gasoline fire, a Sikorsky S-58 delivers aerial fire fighting rig and personnel in a demonstration of the helicopter's capabilities in fighting fires, especially those hard to reach by ground

transport. Downwash from rotor blades helps suppress or extinguish fire and protects firemen from intense heat. This unit, carrying 250 gallons of foam, was designed by American LaFrance in cooperation with Sikorsky Aircraft.



DEEP FREEZE III—In the Antarctic, large Sikorsky S-58s have joined the S-55s widely used for the past three years in U. S. activities supporting the International Geophysical Year. Their duties include passenger and cargo transport, reconnaissance, and search and rescue. The version of the S-58 shown above, the Navy HUS-1A utility configuration, is transporting cargo in Little America.



CHOPPER JOHN—Twin-engined Army H-37s (Sikorsky S-56s) airlifted Honest John missiles, launchers, and crews at Project AMMO, a missile demonstration at White Sands, New Mexico, and Fort Bliss, Texas, to show how helicopters provide mobility for Army missiles under combat conditions. Other Sikorskys flying at Project AMMO were H-34s (S-58s) and H-19s (S-55s).



SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT

STRATFORD, CONNECTICUT

One of the Divisions of United Aircraft Corporation

(Continued from page 4)

flexibility with a chance for more leaders to lead their responsible units—i.e. (platoon, squads, fire teams) by actual commanding, than does the standard LPM version.

Certainly a Marine is trained to be flexible. He should not only know how to fire an M1 effectively but should be equally adept at throwing a grenade and manning a BAR. Learning these varied phases of combat training makes for mental alertness of the individual Marine, and this same training presupposes quick response to any given order. If these same trainees are put in various drill



situations where the same quick responses to orders and subsequent commands are mandatory for effectiveness, then drill proves its worth and definitely enhances the "other wartime activities."

Perhaps the "New Corps" is too well versed on primary MOS duties and certain definite specialization lines, some which obviously preclude aspiring NCO's from developing their leadership abilities to the full-est capacity.

2d Lt G. E. Constantino, Jr.
MWHG-3, 3dMAW
MCAS, Santa Ana, Calif.

Objections . . .

. . . In the May 1958 issue of the GAZETTE you published an Observation Post article titled "Blow up the Marine Corps." I'm inclined to agree with what you've presented. However, I question its feasibility in one or two respects.

In case of enemy action during a crucial operation, what's to prevent the collapse of an inflatable structure from shrapnel or small arms ammunition? Further danger would arise from the enemy's use of tracer ammunition!

These drawbacks may have already been considered. Nevertheless, might I suggest use of a self-sealant from punctures such as present day tires employ. A highly fire-resistant material, possibly finely spun fibre-glass, may be the solution.

No other serious objections come to mind. These structures would furnish excellent cold weather protection, the idea being to improvise shelter halves of such substances.

SSgt V. B. Lorson

809 - 11th Ave SE
Minneapolis, Minn.

Small Disbursements

. . . Administration of public funds involves a trust of high order. Implicit in that trust is not only an unswerving integrity, but the use of accounting procedures which make economic sense. However, in some of their activities DOs are saddled with procedural requirements that are neither sensible nor economical.

Recently I was sent TAD from Camp Pendleton to El Toro for a period of 3-days. I had 5 men with me. Upon return to Camp Pendleton I provided Disbursing the standard original and 2, as did the enlisted members. Several days later I returned to Disbursing, signed a sheaf of accounting documents, and received 4 dollars. The men, for each of whom a separate claim was required, collected one dollar apiece.

I have no certain knowledge upon which to base a disbursement cost estimate. But after looking at the accounting papers involved I feel that each claim will represent a processing outlay of between 15 and 20 dollars by the time it is audited and filed at HQMC. If so, it cost the government a minimum of 90 dollars, in the cited El Toro trip, to effect a payment of 9 dollars.

I think this represents a disproportionate cost ratio which should and can be corrected by combining small disbursements and reporting them with a single set of substantiating papers. Procedurally it would work like this. The DO receives the original and 2; he figures the amount involved to ascertain if it can be handled by this procedure. Let's presume that the maximum payment under this system is 25 dollars. If the claim is for less, he enters the name on a travel-per diem payment list (just like a regular pay list). He maintains in duplicate one of these

lists for each chargeable appropriation. When the payment is effected the payee signs the list and receives the original with the usual payment endorsement. One copy of the orders is appended to the original and one copy to the duplicate pay list. When the list for any chargeable appropriation is closed it is forwarded to HQMC with the attached orders and a single set of accounting documents to cover all payment entries. The duplicate list is retained by the DO as file evidence of disbursements.

Granting the proposed procedure is simpler, what kind of security does it offer. Well, it is possible that someone in the pay system might fabricate orders and defraud the government of a few dollars. But to realize any significant amount an agent in disbursing would have to build an extensive conspiracy with people outside of disbursing. Such a fraud structure would be inherently fragile—would topple with the first slight breeze of suspicion.

Even these slim opportunities for fiscal chicanery could be further attenuated by the use of a simple post card verification system at HQMC. When the travel-per diem payment list is received, a fixed percentage of the name entries are sent returnable




post card queries. They are requested to affirm, or deny, by endorsement, that they have received the payment charged to them and return the cards. Organization headquarters listed as having originated the orders are similarly queried for verification.

When we spend more money than the value of the money spent, we are not fulfilling our public trust. Let's live up to that trust by correcting those disbursing procedures which are obviously incompatible with it.

CWO Earl A. Pike


1st Svc Bn, 1st Mar Div
Camp Pendleton, Calif.

Marine Corps Gazette • September 1958



(TOP) U.S. Navy P2V Neptune
Distance record: 11,236 miles
October 1, 1946

(RIGHT) U.S. Air Force F-104 Starfighter
Altitude record: 91,249 feet
May 7, 1958



(BOTTOM) U.S. Air Force F-104 Starfighter
Speed record: 1,404 miles per hour
May 16, 1958


Only once in modern aviation history have *all three* major world records—for DISTANCE, ALTITUDE and SPEED—been held by the planes of *one* company.

Lockheed achieved this triple triumph in 1958.

LOCKHEED means leadership


LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, CALIFORNIA DIVISION: Burbank and Palmdale, California

JET FIGHTERS • JET TRAINERS • LUXURY AIRLINERS • PROP-JET TRANSPORTS • AIRBORNE EARLY-WARNING AIRCRAFT • ANTI-SUBMARINE PATROL PLANES



basic problems of

EUROPEAN DEFENSE



By B. H. Liddell Hart

✿ A BASIC QUESTION UNDERLIES ANY and all plans of Western defense. Can free Europe be defended? The answer—if we are honest, *and* brave enough to face hard facts—can only be that in the present conditions, and with present plans, effective defense is not possible. For defense in the real sense of the word, as defined in dictionaries, means to “preserve, protect, keep safe, by resisting attack.”

At the present time, if nuclear weapons of megaton power are actually used, no country can hope to

keep safe, or even to avoid fatal destruction. Moreover, as things stand, the NATO countries cannot even attempt to stop any strong invading force without using such weapons. Their ground forces are far too weak, compared with those of Russia, to maintain a prolonged resistance with conventional, non-nuclear, weapons. So they have to put their trust purely in the chances, much less certain, of deterring their enemies from attack by threat of nuclear retaliation.

The essential conclusion was put

clearly by the British Prime Minister when speaking at a dinner given in London to welcome Gen Norstad, the new Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. For Mr. Macmillan there said:

"Let us be under no illusion; military forces today are not designed to wage war; their purpose is to prevent it. There will be no campaigns again like the old ones, with victory at the end of a long and balanced struggle.

"Total war today can only mean total destruction."

The Probable Conditions of Nuclear War

The largest bombs used in Europe during the last war were no more than 5 to 10 tons, and in the largest scale attacks—with forces up to a thousand aircraft—about 5,000 tons were dropped. The first atomic bomb, dropped on Hiroshima in August 1945, had an explosive force equivalent to 20,000 tons. Thus even in the infancy of nuclear warfare a single bomber could exert 4 times as much destructive power as a thousand had done previously.

The first operational hydrogen

bomb, tested in March 1954, is known to have released an explosive force equivalent to 20 million tons—a thousand times greater than the original atomic bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima. One such bomb can destroy the largest city. Only a few would have to reach their targets in order to wipe out the main centers of industry and population in any country of Western or Southern Europe. Even one or two might suffice to paralyze the life of such countries, when account is taken of the vast stretch of the "fall-out" of deadly radioactive dust, as well as of the shattering moral effect.

If such weapons are actually used in war it is unimaginable that the war could continue, even in the "broken-back" way of which Sir Winston Churchill talked 3 years ago: "The conduct of war is a matter of *organized action*, which would be impossible in such a state of chaos." The NATO "shield forces" could not hope to maintain a defense when their sources of supply were destroyed, and their whole purpose would vanish once their homelands were destroyed. Any survivors would be fully occupied in collecting

food and controlling mobs of starving refugees.

What Are the Prospects of Defense Against Nuclear Bombing?


The US Air Defense Command has openly admitted that even "a 90 per cent effective defense might not be good enough to guarantee national survival." Another American authority has stated that "At best—and this is very optimistic—we might intercept one out of every four Soviet bombers." It would be much easier for such bombers to reach and annihilate the more accessible vital centers of countries in Europe. In face of a menace of this scale, the NATO schemes of air defense and civil defense are no more than trifling with the problem. Even if a 100 per cent effective anti-aircraft missile could be produced on the scale required to annul all attacks by bombers, there is no early hope of a counter to the ballistic rocket.

The New Menace of Rocket Bombardment

On 13 February 1957, Britain's Minister of Defence, Mr. Duncan Sandys, publicly confirmed that there was "every reason to believe" that the Russians had developed a "rocket with a nuclear warhead" and that "the range of this rocket would probably be sufficient to reach Britain." By then, that admission understated the grim reality. For it was known from the evidence of radar-traced flights, that Russian rockets were reaching targets 800 to 1,000 miles distant. Moreover there was reason to believe that the Russians had successfully tested a rocket with a range of 1500 miles—sufficient to reach any of the American strategic bomber bases in North Africa and the Middle East.

Then, on 26 August, the Russians announced that they had carried out successful tests of an inter-continental ballistic rocket that could reach "any part of the world."

Those were the key words of the latest Russian announcement that has startled the Western parts of the world. The shock has been all the greater, since it has come so soon after the first test launching of an American inter-continental rocket, the 5,000 mile range Atlas—which ended in failure. Its immediate suc-




cessor, the Titan, is not yet ready for test—and even if successful is not expected to be ready for operational use until the 1960s.

If the Russian claim about their super-rocket is true, the effects on the world balance of power, and our situation, are likely to be far-reaching. It is a very ominous prospect. Experience of the previous Russian announcements that proved true, strongly suggests that the latest is likely to be well-founded. Time after time the Russians have proved successful in reaching some fresh stage of scientific or technical development years before they were expected to achieve it. The success of the "Satellite" has driven home the lesson.

In any case, the NATO countries of Europe, including Britain, all lie within range of the intermediate rockets which Russia has *certainly* got. Western Germany is in closest range of all. The only protection of these countries lies in deterring the Russians from launching an attack—by being able to retaliate with H-bombs. This ability to retaliate depends mainly on the American strategic bombing force, supplemented by Britain's relatively small force of jet-bombers. Here I would again emphasize that, whatever the value of such a force as a *deterrent* to enemy attack, it is of no real value as a *defense*. For if it were used, it would merely result in mutual suicide. That would be the inevitable outcome of war with H-bombs.

The Prospects of Deterrence

A powerful bombing force, armed with nuclear bombs, is a very strong deterrent to any attempt at delivering a knock-out blow with nuclear bombs or rockets, or even at overrunning the NATO countries by ground forces. For it would be the most hazardous gamble for Russia, or any other country, to base a war plan on the belief that the other side's power of retaliation could be nullified by a surprise blow—a new "Pearl Harbor" coup. A sudden and complete knock-out blow would be far more difficult to achieve than in 1941—and that had only a temporary success. For it would be almost impossible to ensure that every bomber on the opposing side is disabled, whereas even a few bombers that survived would be able, with H-bombs, to inflict tremendous destruction in



reply. The dream of a complete knock-out at the start of war has become even more absurd with the development of ballistic rockets that can be launched from anywhere on land or sea.

Unfortunately, this "needle in a haystack" problem also casts grave doubt on the belief still cherished by the Allied military planners—in the Pentagon, at SAC, and at SHAPE—that once the bombers of the US Strategic Air Command are unleashed, they could annul Russia's power of nuclear attack within a few days. So we are brought back again to the conclusion that the only hope of preserving Europe lies in preventing war—and no longer, as in the past, in being able to win a war.

As for the prospects of success in preventing war, their best foundation is formed, ironically, by the lack of any firm foundation for aggressive planning—and the likelihood that the outcome would be as fatal to the attacker as it would be to his victim. It is the basic *uncertainty* of the outlook that does most to strengthen the existing deterrent to aggression—and particularly to any Russian attempt to overrun the free countries of Europe.

There appear to be only 2 conditions in which a deliberately planned onslaught would become more likely:

1) A change in American policy towards a renewed "isolationism," leading the United States Government to withdraw its forces from Europe, and revert to a detached attitude towards what happens in Europe.

2) The possible discovery and development by Soviet Russia of an effective means of countering, and *nullifying*, NATO nuclear retaliation against Russia's territory and forces. The situation would become perilously ill-balanced if Russia produced such a means in advance of the Western Alliance.

America has made much progress in developing anti-aircraft guided missiles to counter bomber aircraft, and it is all too possible that Russia has made similar progress. If Russia should produce an effective antidote to the bomber, and thus nullify our power of "massive retaliation," while at the same time possessing the power herself of bombarding the Western countries with atomic rockets, they would be reduced to a state of helplessness.

I have long thought that a likely sign of success in developing such a bomber antidote would be a bolder and more *intrusive* foreign policy on the Russians' part. That has been manifest recently. But it may be due simply to confidence in their new long-range rockets, coupled with the fact that the small

launching sites required for these are much easier to conceal, and more difficult to knock out, than bomber bases. But to gain the *certainty* of a decisive advantage, Russia would have to produce the counter not only to bombers but to ballistic rockets, and to be sure that the antidote was 100 per cent effective—which, fortunately, is a distant and dubious possibility.

At present, the Western powers' capacity for nuclear retaliation should suffice to deter Russia from launching a large-scale invasion of free Europe, or from attempting to paralyze the Allies' retaliatory power by a surprise blow. But, unfortunately, this power of retaliation is far less sure of proving a deterrent to smaller scale aggression, and it is thus much less of an insurance against the risk of an unintentional slide into an all-out war of mutual suicide.

The Problem of Tactical Atomic Action

A new, and very dangerous, complication has arisen from the decision in 1954 to equip the NATO ground forces, and their supporting

"tactical" air forces, with tactical atomic weapons. It increases the risk that even a local conflict might soon develop into a war of mutual annihilation—unintended by either side.

During a visit to London early this year Gen Norstad had a private talk with a large number of members of Parliament. When pressed as to whether nuclear weapons could be used tactically, against the enemy's forces, without using them strategically, against the enemy's country, he is reported to have replied that in his own mind he found it impossible to draw a line between these forms of action. He left the impression that he could see no hope of stopping short of all-out war with H-bombs.

The arguments for providing the NATO forces with tactical atomic weapons has been that these weapons are essential to counterbalance the Red Army's much larger numbers of men. The soldiers responsible for defense planning naturally desire the maximum possible insurance, and it is not their responsibility to judge whether the *apparent* increase of battlefield insurance of-

fered by atomic weapons is outweighed by the increased risk of chaos and collapse in the homelands. In bowing to the military argument for such extra insurance the statesmen may hopefully think that they can restrain its employment until the need is certain. But this is a frail hope. There is much greater risk in equipping armies with atomic weapons than air forces, since armies are posted in more advanced positions. Commanders will always tend to use every weapon they possess rather than risk their troops being overrun—and in that immediate concern are apt to lose sight of wider issues.

There would be great value in adopting tactical nuclear weapons if, by doubling the resisting power of the present NATO armies, they made it possible to repulse an invasion by the Communists' much larger armies *without* causing the general destruction by H-bombs of the countries on either side. But there is no sense in adding such costly tactical weapons to our armory if they are not considered a practicable *alternative* to strategic nuclear bombardment, and are certain to lead to all-out war—as Gen Norstad appears to think.

The Problem of "Graduated Deterrence"

The insanity of planning a defense that is bound to be suicidal has become so obvious, except to the planners themselves, that it has prompted a growing number of thoughtful minds to consider the possibility of graduated action, or "graduated deterrence" as it has come to be described—unleashing H-bombs only if it is clear that the enemy is making an unlimited attack and cannot be stopped by any lesser means. To evolve a workable plan of graduated action is certainly a knotty problem, requiring extensive study, yet at least worth trying as an alternative to world suicide.

The best chance would obviously lie in confining nuclear weapons to the immediate battlefield, and the chances would decrease in each successive stage of deeper use. At the same time, even the second stage in depth—their use against the aggressor's Lines of Communication area,





and his airfields there—would involve a heavy additional handicap, since the British and American forces will be operating overseas and their seaport advanced bases will be more vulnerable than the other side's land communications.

So there would be compensating advantages for the Western powers in confining nuclear action to the battlefield—which is also the most practicable differential, and perhaps the only one that will allow the defense a chance of profiting by unconventional weapons without precipitating an all-out war. One can, however, see possible ways in which a land-based attacker of strategic ingenuity might nullify a defense geared to tactical atomic weapons—which depend for effect on suitable targets, and are ineffective against dispersion or intermingling.

Is there any other way of increasing our defensive strength, and with a greater chance of avoiding all-out nuclear warfare? The safest course of all in defense would be to rely on conventional forces using purely conventional weapons. A better prospect of limitation is offered by the use of chemical instead of nuclear weapons. For chemical weapons are most effective in checking invasion and delaying all advancing movements on land, while far less effective against stationary forces and cities. It is absurd to forego the defensive use of mustard gas, the most obstructive yet least lethal of

weapons, while adopting the use of nuclear weapons—which are weapons of mass-slaughter, and violate the lawful code of warfare on more counts than such a weapon as mustard gas, which is relatively humane.

The Problem of Deterrence and Defense with "Conventional" Forces

Now that the Russians are matching America in nuclear weapons, the paradoxical consequence is to revive the danger of invasion in a conventional way. For they may be tempted to venture on that kind of attack in the belief that, because of the "nuclear stalemate," the West would hesitate to unleash nuclear weapons—so long as the Russians limited their aims and their action. Hence the need for conventional defense, as a deterrent, is renewed. Is it really so impossible, militarily and economically, to provide adequate defense of this kind as the NATO Governments have come to assume?

Russia and her satellites, from a total population of 300 million, maintain standing armies of about 260 active divisions—of which perhaps 160 face westward. The NATO countries have a population of 230 million in Europe, and 400 million in total, yet produce barely 20 active divisions (of which the majority are not ready for action) to cover the western, and central, area of Europe.

In view of the number of divisions

that the Soviet bloc can maintain, the question arises whether the NATO type and its supporting structure are needlessly elaborate and expensive. Given the will, and new thought, the answer could be found. It makes no sense that the NATO countries should continue to live in mortal fear of a group inferior in population and material resources, and remain impaled on the horns of a "defeat or suicide" dilemma. The economic difficulties of attaining the minimum ground strength required can be diminished by developing new tactics and organization.

The customary type of Western division has a "tail" of non-fighting men—to supply and maintain it—nearly 4 times as large as the Soviet type, and has more than double the number of vehicles, without being appreciably stronger in firepower. Yet, basically, the defending side—operating in its own territory—should not need as high a scale of supply and transport as an attacker coming from a long distance away, and should be able to make effective use of "light" and "local" types of force which require relatively little transport.

The New Possibilities of "Limited War" Strategy

It is essential to realize that while the H-bomb has become a check on the deliberate launching of an all-out attack, it has not reduced the

possibilities of "limited war" to the same extent, and may even increase them. The enemy can exploit a choice of strategic techniques, different in pattern but all designed to make headway for the aggressor while causing hesitancy on the other side in taking the fateful decision to order counteraction with nuclear weapons.

Such aggression might be made at a limited tempo—a gradual process of encroachments. It might be made at a fast tempo but to a limited depth—small "blitz" bites swiftly made, and as swiftly followed up by a conciliatory offer to negotiate. It might take the form of stirring up internal revolt in another country, and then infiltrating or parachuting reinforcements of "volunteers." It might also take a purely subversive form.

It is ironical that the more the

Western powers have developed the massiveness of their strategic air force and the explosive force of the nuclear weapon the more they have tended to aid the progress of the new "mosquito" type strategy employed against them. Their own strategy should be based on a clear grasp of this concept, and their military policy be adjusted to fit it.


The Solution Proposed

What should be done to meet such a wide variety of dangers, ranging from total war to cold war? Can it be done without incurring a financial burden that will break us without a battle? The maintenance and improvement of the nuclear deterrent to war, especially to all-out war, remains the primary requirement.

But there is no need for a strategic bombing force of great size—

as in the last war. With H-bombs, only a small number suffice to inflict overwhelming destruction, if they reach their target. So what counts is not quantity of bombers, but superlative technical *quality* and performance. That applies also to the long-range missile which is likely to supersede the bomber as the means of delivery. There is all the less need for quantity since the purpose is to prevent war, by deterring a would-be attacker, and not to pursue the now futile and obsolete aim of "winning a war."

Once NATO learns the wisdom of concentrating on deterrence, instead of out of date preparation for waging a great war, great savings can be made in bombing forces of the customary kind. For air defense, fighter forces add little to the deterrent compared with their cost, and would be of little avail. They can





be scrapped now—except such part of them as is required for co-operation with troops in “small” warfare—instead of waiting until the new missile-type air defense is ready. In all services, too, large savings can be made by cutting out preparations and stock-piling for a long war of the old unlimited kind.

We can turn now to what is required to meet the local and limited types of aggression that form our most likely risk—frontier “bites,” quick or gradual, and internal outbreaks fomented from outside. To tackle these, the need is for an extensive gendarmerie backed by mobile forces of high efficiency, in a state of constant readiness—like fire brigades.

A short-service conscript army is badly fitted for such tasks; a relatively small professional army would be much better. It could be usefully supplemented, however, by a superior militia type force, locally based.

In tackling these “small war” emergencies we have got to reckon with the possibility that, if the “fire” is not quickly quenched, it may spread—and develop, unintended by either side, into an all-out war.

In this “new model” army, which I visualize, the active troops might be of two types. The striking element would consist of a number of

handy-sized armored divisions, mounted entirely in cross-country vehicles that can move off the road. They would be trained to operate in “controlled dispersion” like a swarm of hornets, offering little target to a nuclear bomb or missile if such were used. The other type, for policing and for mobile defense, would be “light infantry” divisions. They would also be completely capable of moving off roads—but not through mechanization. Their cross-country capacity would come from lightness of equipment.

Besides these mobile forces, it would also be a good insurance—especially against the new risk of a conventional type invasion—if the continental countries were to create militia-type forces—organized to fight in their own locality, and maintain themselves from local stores, distributed in numerous small underground shelters. Such forces, a superior form of “Home Guard,” would provide a deep network of defense, yet need much less transport than the present NATO type, be much less of a target, be less liable to interception, and become effective with far shorter training—so relieving the present burden of conscription.

Such a reorganization would provide the NATO countries with a chance of effective defense without

the extreme peril of resorting to nuclear weapons—and thus strengthen the deterrent.

For the prime need today is to reinforce the H-bomb deterrent, which has turned into a two-edged threat, by developing a non-nuclear “fire-guard” and “fire-extinguisher”—on the ground, and ready for use without hesitation or delay.

The Scale of Forces Required

To provide a reasonably adequate “fire-guard” and “fire-extinguishing” force in Europe is not nearly as big a problem as is apt to be assumed, when considering the problem in the old terms of defense.

Even on the old basis—of capacity to meet a full-scale invasion by the Soviet armies—the Western planners came to the conclusion, in 1950-51, that a Covering Force of 34 divisions should suffice to check a surprise assault on the front between Austria and the Baltic. Of that number, 18 were to be M-day divisions, ready for immediate action (5 American, 5 British, 5 French, 3 Belgian, 2 Dutch), and 16 were to be ready for action in 3 days. While the NATO plan was subsequently expanded to a target of twice that number, the doubling was to be in the form of reserve divisions that could be mobilized to match the corresponding mobilization of the Russian reserves. In other words, the expanded plan was a product of the customary picture of a lengthy struggle in the old style.

In the light of experience, a Covering Force of 34 active divisions held out a good promise of checking an attack by 70 to 100 enemy divisions—the maximum that seemed possible, on a logistical calculation, in the initial stage of a war, and whatever the number of reinforcements that might be mobilized on the Soviet side, it would be difficult to utilize more than double that total, if as many, in a long-distance advance westward. So a NATO Covering Force and reinforcement, of the scale projected in 1950-51, promised a good insurance.

Now the problem has changed, and in the process the scale of ground forces required has diminished. For the Russians could hardly count on being able to carry out a massive invasion of long extent without precipitating a suicidal nu-

clear war. The most that they might hope to bring off is a sudden pounce of a limited kind, brief in time and short in extent. That is a possible venture, and danger, for which NATO should be prepared.

What strength could the Russians employ in such a pounce? There are 22 Russian divisions in East Germany (of which 18 are of mobile armored type), and 2 in Poland, while the Communist East German Army comprises 7 divisions. The shock force for a surprise stroke might possibly be raised to 50 divisions by stealthy reinforcement without alerting the West—although an assault on that scale is the less likely because it would produce a greatly increased risk of bringing on all-out nuclear war. Nevertheless, it may be wise to reckon with the "Worst Possible Case."

What strength does NATO need as an insurance against it? Operational analysis of the later stages of the last war shows that Allied attacks against the Germans rarely succeeded unless the attacking troops had a superiority in strength of more than 5 to 1, accompanied by domination of the air—and sometimes failed with odds of nearly 10 to 1 in their favour. On the Eastern Front, where the Russian attacker had no such decisive domination of the air, the Germans often held their own against attacks delivered with a superiority, in men and weapons, of 7 to 1—or even more. The ratio of space to force is apt to be the crux of the problem—subject to the state of morale and the relative mobility of the opposing forces. The issue tends to turn on whether the attacker has room for maneuver—to outflank, or penetrate weak stretches in the opposing network of fire.

Yet even on such a very wide front as that in Russia it became evident that a well-conducted mobile defense could be maintained indefinitely unless the attacking side had an overall superiority considerably exceeding 3 to 1. It may be wise to make a larger allowance for the unequal quality of the present NATO forces (with their mixture of nationalities and of training systems), and for increased efficiency on the Russian side. Even so, they ought to be able to hold their own with a ratio of 1 to 2, while a ratio

of 2 to 3 should ensure a safe margin.

On that basis, a mobile force of 20 active divisions should be a good insurance against a sudden "pounce" by the Soviet troops that are on the spot, while a force of some 30 divisions should suffice to check even the possible but less likely scale of assault that might be achieved by stealthy reinforcement prior to the pounce. Numerically, the lower insurance figure has been attained with the formation of the first batch of German divisions, and the higher insurance figure will be with-



in close reach when the rest of the promised 12 German divisions are formed. Thus, in terms of numbers, only a small further effort is required from the other member countries; the return of the 4 French divisions that were sent to Algeria would bridge the gap.

But the insurance cannot be regarded as good until the state of readiness for action is much improved. The proportion of "M-day" divisions is too small. No less important is their suitability, for kinds of action that are most likely to be needed—i.e. quenching a local outbreak of "fire" before it spreads, or

repelling a sudden pounce by mechanized or airborne forces. These two kinds of action call for different types of force—"light infantry" divisions primarily in the first case; armored divisions primarily in the second case. And in either case, the addition of a localized militia would increase the insurance at comparatively little cost.

The present type of heavily armed infantry division, which is now the preponderant element in the NATO "shield force," is much less suitable for either of these kinds of action. The "light infantry" division would cost less and require less "tail" (of non-fighting personnel), so that more divisions could be provided from the same amount of money and manpower. That would be an aid towards making "fire-extinguishers" available for the small countries such as Denmark, that lie on the flanks of the main, "Central Europe," front—dangerously exposed to a Russian pounce. Moreover, in the event of nuclear weapons being used, the 3 types of force proposed are better suited to survive than the present "heavy" infantry division.

This reflection brings us back, in conclusion, to the problem of tactical atomic weapons. It would be better if such weapons had never been introduced. Not only have they increased the risk of local conflicts developing into total war, but they may even turn to our disadvantage—now that the Russians have also got them. For besides the vulnerability of our seaport bases, static defense positions may prove more vulnerable than a well-dispersed attacking force of armored type. There is reason to think that the Russians have gone ahead of Western armies in developing methods of dispersed and invisible advance.

But since the Russians have got the tactical atomic weapon, the Western forces can hardly discard it. It is bound to be kept as "a card up the sleeve"—though we should be wiser to keep it well up the sleeve than to play it at an early stage. It should be regarded as a "last but one" resort—and it would at least be worth using it, in a limited way, before unleashing strategic nuclear action against the hinterland.

We are left with the problem of

how the tactical atomic weapon can be kept without making the NATO forces so dependent on it, and their organization so entwined with it, that they are incapable of effective action in non-nuclear ways. To embody any form of such weapon in divisions, or even in corps, is a short-sighted policy—however attractive it may look. The best solution is to abstain from organizational integration, except at the highest levels—in other words, to allot the weapon only to special nuclear-weapon detachments that can be kept “attachable,” high up the sleeve.

The New Development of Strategy

Old concepts, and old definitions, of strategy have become not only *obsolete*, but *nonsensical* with the development of nuclear weapons. The development of long-range rockets, to replace the manned bomber aircraft, makes the absurdity even clearer. To aim at “winning a war,” to take “victory” as your object, is no more than a state of *lunacy*. For a total war, with nuclear weapons, would be fatal to both sides.

There is no sense even in planning for such a war—for a World War III, as it is often called. In the present stage of scientific development, the destruction and chaos would be so great *within a few hours* that the war could not continue in any *organized* sense.

Yet it is astonishing to see the extent to which old-fashioned concepts continue to influence military planning. They are repeatedly revealed by the use of out-of-date terms, and the pattern of exercises. This is shown even in the use of the word “sword” for the *deterrent*—which is mainly provided by the US Strategic Air Force—and “shield” for the NATO ground forces. For the “sword” could not be *used*, actually, without producing mutual suicide. It is like the old ceremonial Japanese sword dedicated for committing *hara-kiri*. And the old word “shield” does not suggest the kind of protection required to meet the nibbling, erosive forms of aggression that have now become more likely than “sword-thrusts.” A shield is not a suitable protection against wasps, nor against incendiary fires.

Strategy—which aims at military

victory—should always be subordinate to Grand Strategy, the realm of statesmanship which is concerned with the ultimate state of peace. This has too often been disregarded in the past. Now, more than ever Grand Strategy must be in the driving seat.

Statesmanship, in the H-bomb age must control not only the aims but the operations. It should direct military defense planning, and the formulation of military doctrine. Hence statesmen and their diplomatic advisers must have a greater knowledge of military technique than they needed in the past. That is as important as the need for soldiers to submit to political direction. Even if we do not go so far as to merge the function of the Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister, they and their expert advisers must combine much more closely.

It is a new version of Plato's dictum that the affairs of the world would not improve until either the philosophers became the rulers or the rulers became the philosophers.

US MC



Junior Marine

HAVING BEEN BORN INTO THE MARINE CORPS and having cut his eye teeth on a swagger stick, my 6-year-old son, Mike, was a little more than unhappy when I was assigned for duty under instruction at the Army Security Agency School at Fort Devens, Massachusetts. To him the only man in uniform who matters at all is a US Marine.

We had been at Fort Devens about 2 weeks when this event occurred:

At dinner one night I asked Mike what he had been doing all day. His reply was that he had been playing Marines, with all the other boys. “Don’t you mean playing soldiers?” I asked. “No Sir, Daddy, they play soldiers, I play Marines!”

Capt Dale Thornton

Subtle Reprimand

WE OF THE 2D BN, 6TH MARINES were living in tents in 1941 at newly opened Camp Elliott near San Diego. One of the Marines in my squad seemed to have adopted a “don’t give a damn” attitude and our rather youthful squad leader hadn’t had much success in getting him to cooperate.

One day our corporal approached our taciturn, tobacco chewing Gunnery Sergeant and explained that he just couldn’t seem to straighten his problem child out. The Gunny listened patiently, nodded, then strolled down the row of tents to the living quarters of the rebellious private and stuck his head through the tent fly. “Get your gear ready, Jones, you’re being transferred,” he said . . . and without another word, he continued his stroll along the duckboards and vanished around the tent at the head of the Company street.

Jones proceeded to pack his sea bag, fold up his cot, turn in his equipment to the company storeroom and get dressed in the proper uniform. Some 2 hours later the Gunny appeared again on the company street and found Jones in front of his tent sitting on top of his seabag perspiring freely in his freshly donned khaki, but ready to go. “Where am I going, Gunny?” he asked. The Gunny answered, “To the third squad, Jones . . . that’s 2 tents down.” . . . and without another word or a backward glance, continued his leisurely stroll down the company street.

Maj J. R. Kearney




The Marine Corps Association, publishers of the *GAZETTE*, will again award the championship plaque and marksmanship proficiency certificates at the second annual Unit Combat Marksmanship Competition to be held Sept 9-11 at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va.

Top Marine rifle squads from each infantry regiment in the Marine Corps will fire in the 2-day competition.

The event was originated last year to stimulate training of the squad in offensive combat and to determine the Marine rifle squad most proficient in combat marksmanship.



Helicopters armed with machine guns and rockets, may soon become standard equipment for the Army.



The Bell H-13, equipped with .30 cal. machine guns and 80 mm rockets, has demonstrated effective use against ground troops, road blocks and dug in positions in recent Army tests.

Proved capable of producing fire-power equivalent to that of a reinforced rifle squad, the 'copter flies below tree-top level, leaps up, fires a burst, then drops behind trees or hills to take cover and move to a new position.

Shown taking off from a Paris airfield is the Breguet 940 STOL which has made 7 test flights, remaining airborne for over 15 minutes in one test and attaining an altitude of over 3,000 feet.



The craft is the first STOL to fly with 4 interconnected propellers and utilizes the deflected slipstream principle to achieve near vertical takeoff.

When testing of the 940 has been completed, the French manufacturer and the Piasecki Aircraft Corp. plan to proceed with plans for a 16-ton version of the aircraft which will be capable of landing on unprepared fields in 650 feet or less and carrying 40 passengers.

Under a technical interchange and cross-licensing agreement, Piasecki will be sales agent and distributor for the 940 in the US and Canada and will also be able to manufacture the aircraft in this country.




Nine types of missiles will be used by the Marine Corps to arm its troops. Four, now operational, include the *Honest John*, surface-to-surface rocket, the surface-to-air *Terrier*, and the *Sparrow* and *Side-winder* air-to-air weapons. Scheduled for future use are the surface-to-surface *Little John* and *Lacrosse*,

the surface-to-air *Hawk*, the air-to-surface standoff bomb *Bull Pup*, and an advanced version of the *Sparrow*.



Photographic exposures of a hundred-millionth of a second have been achieved at Avco Manufacturing Corp. in connection with development of the nose cone for the Air Force's Titan ICBM.



The shutter used for the ultra-fast exposures is the Kerr cell, specially adapted by the firm for this project.

Used as model missiles, bullets from high-powered guns are "frozen" so completely by the high-speed shutter that rifling marks are clearly visible.

An idea of how fast the shutter operates is given by the fact that a car traveling at 60 miles an hour covers a distance equal to one-tenth the thickness of the paint on its body in one microsecond. The shutter operates at one-hundredth of a microsecond.



Wheeled amphibians with payload capacities of 5 and 15 tons are being developed to replace the 21½-ton DUKWs of WWII.

A division of the Borg-Warner Corp. has received an Army contract to design and construct prototype models of the new amphibians which will be known as the LARC (Lighter, Amphibious, Resupply, Cargo).

The design emphasizes marine capabilities and promises greater speed and ability to negotiate heavy surf. Other features include lightweight aluminum construction with four-wheel drive, interchangeable engines and power trains, and large-diameter, low pressure tires.

re·lent'less: *a missile that pierces hostile sky to pinpoint its nuclear strike*

When a target's latitude and longitude are marked on this missile's brain, an appointment has been made.


To keep its rendezvous, the Chance Vought *Regulus II* performs miracles of navigation: it will launch stealthily from submarines — nuclear and conventional — from surface craft and mobile shore launchers. It will compensate automatically for wind and weather and for the earth's rotation. It will detour enemy strongpoints, outfox known counterweapons. Closing in on its quarry, it can abruptly descend from over 60,000 feet to smoke-stack height to escape radar detection.

In minutes, *Regulus II* can pierce over 1,000 miles of hostile sky to score a nuclear bull's-eye.

The first of the Navy's nuclear-driven subs, designed to roam the seas as unseen *Regulus II* bases, is now in construction. The missile itself has made over 25 successful flights. Under Navy leash in key locations, it will be a relentless watchdog for peace.

CHANCE
VOUGHT AIRCRAFT
INCORPORATED · DALLAS, TEXAS





By LtCol Dennis D. Nicholson, Jr.

"Creeping Tactics," a term that may soon be found in military dictionaries, was coined by Marines. The term describes one of the most intriguing characteristics of the enemy who faced the 1st MarDiv in Korea.



TACTICS

Marines in Korea, with a wary eye on the Intelligence Officer's situation map, watched red grease pencil marks slowly close the gap between friendly and enemy lines. The enemy was simply creeping in on The United Nations forces. The expression "creeping tactics" was used loosely to describe this phenomenon. The term was lent credence when the commander of the 7th Marines used it in a press interview to describe the character of

the enemy his regiment was fighting. Shortly thereafter it appeared in a 1st MarDiv PIR (Periodic Intelligence Report) and it was only a short time before Eighth Army Headquarters had accepted the term in official usage.

With this creeping stratagem our enemy in Korea took every inch of ground he could get without a fight. From well established, thoroughly consolidated positions (which we would call his MLR) the enemy

would tentatively creep forward to establish an outpost position. If his initial advance did not meet violent resistance, he developed the outpost until it was, for all practical purposes, an MLR position. Then he repeated the process. He stopped only when halted by stiff opposition.

The enemy would find an unoccupied hill forward of his battle position and dig defenses on it at night. At dawn he returned to his own MLR. Once the defenses had been



LtCol Nicholson enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1938 and was commissioned in 1942. Among various assignments during the past 20 years, have been: CO, USS Monterey; Enlisted Performance Division, HQMC; PIO, NERD & SERD; Secretary, MCDC, Quantico; Chief, Editorial and Manuals Section, MCDC, Quantico; MCDC Liaison Officer, FMFPac; S3, 2/7 & 3/7. He is a graduate of Junior School and at present is Head, Press Branch, Division of Information, HQMC.

sufficiently developed, they were occupied permanently and the enemy renewed his search farther forward for another unoccupied hill on which to commence digging new emplacements. This creeping aimed at gaining improved observation of friendly positions with minimum expenditure of men and ammunition. Often new terrain organized with the creeping method was inferior to that formerly occupied. However, the new forward positions screened the enemy MLR and, in effect, constituted an OPLR. They also provided positions from which a short, violent assault might attain initial success.

Marines became thoroughly acquainted with the creeping maneuver, and were primed to immediately blast the enemy every time he crept out of his main positions. Friendly patrols, raids, and limited objective attacks were designed to keep the enemy so completely off balance that creeping was impossible.

One day the Chinese communists awoke to find that they had no monopoly on the tactics of creeping. The 1st MarDiv had carved out gains of more than a thousand meters by creeping forward on a 4-company front. The creep, which was stealthily accomplished by degrees, initially caught the communists completely by surprise. When the move was complete, 2/7 and Item Company, 3/7, held a new MLR on terrain far superior to their former positions.

While those 4 companies were using the creeping technique to gain better defensive terrain, George Company, with a variation of the same tactics, was improving the integrity of the battle position in another part of the regimental sector. "George" was expanding a small outpost into a reinforced company perimeter defensive position. Located as

it was, far forward of the MLR, this outpost gave depth to friendly defenses and its development was a clear adaptation of the enemy's creeping.

This article recounts Item Company's move forward. Multiplying Item's story by 4 should give the reader a fair idea of the whole creeping operation.

When Item took over a company sector on the old MLR, the company commander thought he'd have his hands full carrying on normal company routine and maintaining the bunkers and trench systems. Normal routine consisted of a staggering number of patrols, manning 2 combat outposts, and setting an imposing number of ambushes and listening posts each night. This routine was punctuated by periodic enemy probes. The outposts were known as Yellow and Black (actual code names which were later changed several times) and the enemy was showing considerable interest in them.



So much, in fact, that he hardly let a night go by without attacking one or the other or both of them.

The mission of Item, like every other Marine company in Korea, was difficult. But a new plan was taking shape—a plan that would make Item's mission more complicated. The plan was for Item, using a spot near the left limiting point on the old MLR as pivot point, to swing the MLR forward along an obvious ridge line so that the right limiting point would rest on Black, 1050 meters forward of its former location.

The plan to move the MLR forward, materialized at regiment. It was conceived when the regiment's right MLR battalion proposed improving its dispositions by moving forward to better defensive ground. When this plan was plotted on the regimental S-3's situation map, it appeared logical to alter the original recommendation slightly, to include moving part of the left battalion forward.

Before approving the plan, regiment requested a recommendation from the left MLR battalion. The battalion commander's ground reconnaissance confirmed what previous observations from the old MLR and air and map reconnaissance had indicated: the old MLR would be untenable, if the enemy held any of the critical features along the proposed new MLR. We had to have the new ground.

With both battalions favoring the move, the regimental commander began his own reconnaissance. The map and air reconnaissance was easily accomplished. Business picked up, though, before he and his S-3 were able to examine the prospective line on the ground. While the commander of the left battalion, preparing for his second tour of the proposed MLR, and those 2 officers were studying the area from the old MLR before taking a patrol out to the new line, an enemy artillery round hit in the aperture of a friendly bunker, wounding all 3 of them. The wounds were not serious but the reconnaissance had to be postponed.

Regiment finally approved the MLR change and the move was shortly accepted all the way back to Corps Headquarters, where it was immediately considered of a higher priority than any other project on the entire Corps front.

The plan for building the new line in Item's sector called for Black to be developed first. Then, with a strong force holding Black, the line would be built both ways—right from the pivot point and left from Black—until complete (meaning tenable, since no defensive position is ever "complete"). Initially, a platoon would work on Black during the day and a squad would hold it at night. When sufficient positions were dug, a platoon would occupy Black continuously, working day and night.

The engineers were first to build a supply road directly to Black and then construct a road behind and almost parallel to the new MLR. Fortunately all this work could be done on the reverse slope until such time as construction of forward slope bunkers and trenches was commenced.

During the day everyone on Black would work on the reverse slope, concealed from enemy observation while digging reverse slope trenches, constructing a supply point to be used when the road was built, building helicopter strips for evacuation and emergency supply, and digging connecting trenches from the reverse slope forward. At night the old outpost trench at Black would be expanded and the spoil carried to the reverse slope so the enemy



couldn't observe the results of the digging.

Item would continue to man Yellow, which was some 300 meters forward of the trace of the new line, with a reinforced squad as security for the new positions.

Using Black's method of hiding spoil and following the same priority of works, the first platoon would work from the left, while the second and third platoons shared the big job of defending and developing positions around Black.

With that much of the movement plan approved at battalion, Item started digging, while the battalion commander and his staff contemplated ways and means of turning the envisioned trench and road trace into a finished, tactically sound defensive position.

The pattern of enemy activity clearly indicated that Item, extended as it was over 2 MLR sectors, would need help against the possibility that the enemy might make a strong probe at friendly positions. The regimental commander attached to Item a reinforced platoon from the reserve battalion and that platoon was assigned the mission of helping defend the old MLR, giving Item a freer hand to work on the new positions.

The battalion commander assigned the S-3 as coordinator of the battalion's effort to assist Item. He ordered the S-4 to secure maximum Korean Service Corps assistance and to ascertain requirements for, and requisition, camouflage and fortifications material necessary to build an "ideal" battle position in Item's sector. Together the S-3 and S-4 computed these requirements and made plans for pre-fabricating nearly 100 bunkers required to house a beefed-up Item company.

While the S-3 cannibalized bunker plans, drafted by the Engineer Battalion and other infantry battalions, to come up with the best possible composite bunker, S-4 was procuring the required engineer tools, including a power saw to be used in cutting bunker sections according to pattern.

The S-4 had reason to be thankful for the high priority with which Corps had blessed Item's move. The quantity of logs and dimensional timbers required to build that many bunkers to withstand a direct 105mm hit was astounding. It was necessary to use the Corps priority as a lever to pry out from rear supply dumps the vast quantity of required materials.

In a short while timbers and logs began arriving at the battalion sup-



ply point and a large cleared area near the battalion CP suddenly took on an air of feverish activity. One crew of skilled KSC workers was assigned to each battalion carpenter and the job of prefabricating bunkers was begun. Initially one crew worked in daylight hours and another at night, utilizing a dim light the communication officer rigged up for the night shift.

The S-4 and the supply officer wrestled with logistical and supply problems, respectively. S-3 made the tactical plan fit the ground and stayed one jump ahead of bunker building crews. Bunker sites were picked for 3 A-6 machine guns, 2 heavy machine guns, 12 light machine guns, and two .50 caliber machine guns. Amazing as it may seem, this was Item's complement of guns, and was about average for a reinforced Marine company on the MLR in Korea.

Each gun position was marked with a stake which designated the type gun to be emplaced at the point indicated. Then the battalion commander toured the position with his S-3 and approved the positioning of machine guns. In addition, the battalion commander approved FPL's and sectors of fire where indicated.

Careful planning made it possible for personnel to do most of the bunker construction from protected positions behind filled sand bags or from inside one of the deep bunker holes. Concealment for bunker con-

struction was obtained through the use of garlanded camouflage nets, vertical screens made of chicken wire with green brush or garlands woven through it, and transplanted trees and other greenery. When foliage on such trees began to turn brown, green garlands were tied on limbs to replace, and give the same impression as, leaves.

Once the machine gun bunkers were staked out, Item's company commander placed his rifle and automatic rifle bunkers within the framework of the selected machine gun positions and designated limiting points between platoons.

As rapidly as the engineers cleared mines from in front of the battle position, fields of fire were improved and tactical and protective wire installed. The 60mm section, which had been employed in reverse slope

bunker and gun pit construction, took over the more hazardous job of installing the first tactical wire.


Signs, indicating gun positions, were staked out along with other signs that spelled trouble for any enemy mass attack. These signs read FLAME. Each one marked a draw that couldn't be covered properly by machine gun fire. In each of these draws the Anti-Tank Platoon Commander installed a 55-gallon fougasse, improvised from demolitions, WP grenades, napalm solution in an oil drum and an SCR 300 radio battery to supply the electrical charge. These fougasses were placed so that the 100-yard flame spread would cover the draw when the charge was set off from a control bunker on the MLR.

The company had another potent flame weapon. It was a jeep flame-thrower which had been improvised at Corps Headquarters and assigned to the 1st MarDiv. It had a 100-foot hose connection and a 100-yard flame range. This weapon was installed in a bunker that permitted it to exit rapidly onto an access road along which it could move to alternate positions from which any attempted penetration could be met.

Tank firing positions were dozed to provide hull defilade. The access road facilitated moving tanks from one firing position to another as new targets were detected. Tanks didn't man these positions continuously, of course. They supported Item only during special operational situations.

Rockets and recoilless rifles were dug into bunkers with openings to accommodate the back blast of those weapons.





A Signal Corps listening device of the type being issued to all Marine companies in Korea was set up. It consisted of 5 microphones that could be placed up to 2 miles away from the control box. The control box was an amplifier which told a monitor back on the MLR of any enemy movement near one of the mikes. Of course, the mikes and the wires connecting them with the control box were concealed and had to be installed at night.

Communications-wise, the company CP bunker had built into it an overhang which provided radio operators overhead protection from incoming artillery and, at the same time, permitted optimum radio reception. Lateral communication wire for the company's sound powered telephone net was strung in trenches. It was secured to the forward trench wall by looping the wire around the rim of expended .50 caliber machine gun rounds which had been driven into the side of the trench at the desired height. This method gave the wire maximum protection from shell fragments as well as from traffic through the trenches. All other wire was dug in or strung overhead on poles, including wire to the outposts.

In between counter-battery fire missions, the 60mm, 81mm, 4.2mm

and artillery forward observers, registered their concentrations and final barrages. Back at battalion, the Supporting Arms Center was recording counter-battery missions. Utilizing this information and additional intelligence information supplied by air and artillery, a counter-battery plan was devised solely for the protection of Item's construction project. This plan served to reduce the amount of incoming artillery and mortar fire that continually harassed Item's effort.

The other daylight menace to development of the new battle position was sniper fire. To counteract this activity, Item pressed two .50

caliber machine guns into service as counter-sniper weapons. These guns were equipped with snooper-scope sights. They were extremely effective in silencing enemy snipers.

At night, ambushes and listening posts were set between the new and the old MLR's to intercept small enemy units which were showing a steadily increasing interest in the activity in that area. The same security was employed forward of the new MLR. Since Item was too busy digging to undertake extensive patrol or raid activity, other companies were assigned patrol and raid missions in Item's sector. All these operations were designed to prevent the enemy from ascertaining exactly what was taking place.

When the development of this new battle position was in full swing, 140 KSC's were employed in the Item company area. The reverse slopes were as busy as ant hills as these personnel and the Marines hauled up construction material and dug. The equivalent of an engineer platoon was also busy on the reverse slope. Two dozers were building roads, mine clearance teams were sweeping bypassed areas which were littered with mines, and one engineer team was blasting in front of the dozers, while a second operated a power saw that was doing jack-of-all-work for the construction job. Crews were constructing reverse slope bunkers to house company supply, the CP, the mortar section, and the galley crew was busy erecting a new galley and a living bunker for the cooks and messmen.

Those bunkers were the only ones permitted on the reverse slope. All



others were forward slope bunkers and every member of the rifle platoon, including the platoon leader, fought and lived in the same bunker. Special forward slope bunkers were cut for platoon CP's. These were combination CP-OP bunkers from which the platoon leader could control his unit and observe his sector while his runner fired in the regular defense plan, if required.

Forward slope activity in daylight finally became extensive but as stealthy as possible. Some mine-clearing and wire-laying had to be done on the forward slopes in daylight. Fortunately there was sufficient vegetation to conceal this activity. Forward slope bunker construction went ahead, partially concealed by the natural and artificial means already discussed.

When Item Company was relieved, after a relatively short and extremely busy tour on the line, the creeping movement's first phase was complete. The relieving company, after a thorough inspection of the new position, rightly felt that it had inherited the best company defensive area on the division front.

The successful movement of Item company to its new position under the very eyes of the enemy was clear exploitation of a page from the enemy's book. It is a lesson that might be used over and over again. We can profit much from borrowing the best ideas of the enemy while we continue to develop new ideas of our own.

That we had profited became crystal clear when our holding these new positions made it possible for Marines to capture Bunker Hill. The Bunker Hill operation was an ex-

tension of creeping tactics borrowed from the enemy and it would not have been feasible without the bold move that Item so successfully executed. By using an enemy concept, we had made the entire Corps defense sector much more nearly secure and we had won the loudest praise of the Corps commander.

It seems unlikely that such deliberate development of a battle position will be possible in any type of fighting except position warfare of the Korean variety. However, creeping tactics can be adapted for incorporation into practically any ground combat situation.

Marine Corps doctrine should include creeping tactics. These tactics should be based on the following rules:

- 1) When an objective is secured and the hasty defense assumed, add depth to friendly defensive dispositions initially by creeping forward to establish combat outpost positions.

- 2) If the terrain and enemy resistance permits, additional friendly units creep forward to establish a battle position in the vicinity of the original combat outposts. The forward-most elements within the new position would be utilized as a line of departure for subsequent attacks.

- 3) Repeat the above process as long as terrain gained is valuable and friendly casualties are light.

- 4) Conventional tactics should be supplemented by creeping tactics only so long as friendly casualties are not heavy. Revert to conventional assault or static defensive attitudes as soon as heavy casualties are sustained by elements employing creeping tactics.

- 5) Prior to launching an offensive or limited objective attack from static defensive positions, friendly units should creep as near to enemy defenses as possible without sustaining excessive casualties.

- 6) Creeping, as the name implies, will habitually utilize maximum stealth and caution, normally be accomplished under cover of darkness, and most often will include preparing extensive defensive works with emphasis on communication trenches between forward-most elements and the main battle position.

- 7) Maintain a counter-reconnaissance screen to prevent the enemy from securing information concerning creeping that is being undertaken.

Although creeping may be employed in various types of warfare, it will be most significant in the early stages of operations where friendly and enemy forces are jockeying for defensive positions and in later static periods when opposing forces are separated by a deep no-man's-land. The creep will take on added significance in operations where political considerations or military agreements preclude conventional attacks and where dispositions may be enhanced only by maneuver of unconventional character.

Our enemy in Korea learned many a trick from us. Creeping tactics we learned from him. We should constantly study enemy tactics with a view to adopting any techniques which might be exploited to our own advantage.

We should remember one of Ovid's maxims: *It is lawful to be taught by an enemy.* USMC

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For Old China Hands

IN THE DAYS just before WWII as the Fourth Marines were getting ready to pull out of Shanghai, security was the watchword. Each school period began and ended with the admonition "your safety depends on secrecy . . . keep your mouth shut!"

One day during this period the phone in the guard shack at the 2d Bn compound rang and the Corporal of the Guard answered it.

A female voice, with a foreign accent inquired sweetly, "Has Sergeant Jack Mills checked out on liberty yet?"

"I'm sorry, madam," the Corporal answered firmly, "but I'm not allowed to give any information on troop movements."

Fred Stolley



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without filling**

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calories . . . never heavy, never too
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The Light refreshment



OKINAWA

By LtCol Thomas M. Burton

IN REVIEW

THE ISLAND OF OKINAWA HAS already assumed a large place in the annals of Marine history, and developments indicate many Marines of the future will chalk up this distant Pacific isle as a duty station. One of the results of the 1957 mid-year conference of President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Kishi was the establishment of all elements of the 3rd MarDiv on Okinawa by late fall of last year. Our government has more than once announced its intention to retain administrative control of the island (in accordance with the Japanese Peace Treaty ratified in 1952) as long as international tension exists in the Far East. These facts make it important to Marines, for both personal and professional reasons, to be well-informed on the Ryukyuan island of Okinawa. The objective of this article is to provide a summary of factual information on the island in this year of 1958.

The island is a vastly different place today than it was when the Marines of the III Amphibious Corps came ashore Easter Sunday in 1945. Thirteen years of American residence, plus service as an important Korean War supporting-establishment for both the Army and the Air Force, has served to change both the people and the terrain. It is today frequently referred to as the Keystone of the Pacific to emphasize its strategic importance.

Of prime importance to Marines is the construction of 2 permanent installations—both destined for completion in the latter part of 1959. In the north central part of the is-

land, on the eastern shore, site preparation for Camp Schwab was commenced in March 1957. This camp, destined to serve as the home of a regimental size unit, is named for Pfc Albert E. Schwab who was awarded the Medal of Honor for service with the 1st Bn, 5th Marines, in 1945. Ground was broken for the first buildings in February of this year. An appropriate stone marker was laid with a lacquered Marine Corps Seal attached. The buildings will be constructed of pre-cast concrete, and the design is somewhat similar to those located at Twenty-Nine Palms, California.

Near the center of the island, Mobile Construction Battalion No. 3, a part of our Pacific Fleet Seabees, commenced site preparation early this year for a Marine Corps Helipoint destined to become Marine Corps Air Facility, Futema, Okinawa.

These permanent installations will make duty for the Okinawan Marine far different than it is today. Our units are presently occupying some 10 temporary camps, one of which is largely canvas. Thus the Marine of the '50s, as the Marine of the '40s, the '30s, ad infinitum, is demonstrating his versatility and capability of being "at home" in hovel or mansion.



Marine Corps Headquarters has also provided an embryonic Marine Corps Base organization to support the FMF elements on the island. This increasingly important command proudly bears the name of one of the truly distinctive Marine greats of the past, MajGen Smedley D. Butler. This small command was

given its christening 1 April 1957, and it has become a worthy brother to its elders, the Marine Corps Bases at Camps Lejeune and Pendleton.

US Marines first visited the island of Okinawa in company with Commodore Perry in the 1850s on the voyages made in "opening" up Japan. At this time Okinawa was part of an "independent" kingdom that paid obeisance to both China and Japan. The Ryukyus were known as the Liu Ch'ius, and it is interesting to note that Commodore Perry thought the US should have a foothold in the islands. One of his reasons was his desire to counter Russian schemes in the Pacific area.

In 1871 occurred what has come to be referred to as "the Formosan incident," and it was this affair and actions ensuing largely therefrom that gave Japan sovereignty over the Ryukyus.

In November 1871, a Ryukyuan junk was stranded off the east coast of Formosa (which belonged to China at that time), and 54 of the 66 members of the crew were killed and eaten. The Ryukyuan government sought the aid of Japan in securing indemnities from the weak Chinese central government. This move pleased Japan inasmuch as Japan already claimed the Ryukyus as part of the Japanese realm. The Japanese actively engaged in the matter of seeking compensation for the Formosan act of brutality, and sent a punitive expedition to Formosa. In 1874 China agreed to pay indemnity, and at the same time recognized Ryukyuan as Japanese subjects. The Japanese, for their



part, withdrew the expedition from Formosa. There were differences of interpretation of this 1874 treaty, concerning whether or not it constituted formal abandonment of China's claims to the Ryukyus, but China was too weak and had too many other concerns at this time to press the matter with Japan.

By 1879 the Japanese authorities had taken over all political rights from the king of the Ryukyus and had organized the administration of the islands as the Okinawa prefecture. This status remained constant until 1946, and this is the basis of our government's position in agreeing that Japan possesses "residual sovereignty" over the island archipelago.

Political groupments opposed to

continued US administrative control of the Island have been gaining increasing voting strength. As Karl von Clausewitz logically affirmed, wars are fought for political purposes, and it has always been important that Marines be adequately and accurately informed on political situations. The Marines who landed with Commodore Perry were scrupulously provided all known knowledge about people and country, and it is equally appropriate that Marines coming to Okinawa today be instructed in knowledge of the land, the people and their government.

The Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at San Francisco on 8 September 1951, provided that Japan retain the sovereignty but rec-

ognized the American right of administration of Nansei Shoto—meaning the Ryukyu Islands south of 29 degrees North Latitude. These islands embrace 4 Guntos or groups of islands. From north to south, we find the Amami Gunto, the Okinawa Gunto, the Miyako Gunto and the Yaeyama Gunto. The day before Christmas, 1953, the US relinquished its rights over the northernmost Amami group, and Secretary Dulles issued a policy statement which included, in pertinent part:

"The United States Government believes that it is essential to the success of the cooperative effort of the free nations of Asia and of the world in the direction of peace and security, that the United States continue to exercise its present powers and rights in the remaining Ryukyu Islands . . . so long as conditions of threat and tension exist in the Far East . . . Accordingly, the United States intends to remain as custodian of these islands for the foreseeable future."

At the present time a Presidential Executive Order (No. 10713 dated 5 June 1957) provides for the administration of the Ryukyu Islands. By this order the Secretary of Defense is directed to administer the islands, except that the Secretary of State is to be "responsible for the conduct of relations with foreign countries and international organizations." The Secretary of Defense has further delegated the task to the Department of the Army, and a Department of Army Directive (Subject: US Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands) has provided implementing instructions for the Presidential Executive Order.

The governmental machinery, provided for in these instructions, includes a High Commissioner (appointed by the President from among active duty officers of the Armed Services—the office is presently filled by an Army Lieutenant General), a US Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR), and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI). This latter organization embraces executive, legislative and judicial functions. "The executive power of GRI shall be vested in a Chief Executive who shall be a Ryukyuan, appointed by the High Commissioner after consultation with the representatives of the leg-

LtCol Burton was commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1941 after graduating from Baylor University. He has served with: 2d Marines; VMSB 333; Amphibious Force, Pacific; 5th Base Depot; 1st MarDiv; FMF, WesPac. He has attended both Junior and Senior Schools and was an Instructor in the Logistics Section, MCEC, Quantico. His present assignment is to I&I duty, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Prior to this new assignment, he served as Executive Officer, Camp Smedley D. Butler, Okinawa, and it was here that he wrote this article.

islative body." (Section 8, Executive Order). The members of the legislature (single house) are elected biennially in even numbered years. Mayors of municipalities are elected in accordance with procedures established by the legislature. Members of the independent judiciary are appointed by the GRI Chief Executive. The Executive Order clearly specifies that the High Commissioner has full authority to veto or annul laws, to promulgate ordinances, to remove public officials from office, and to exercise full authority in the Islands as may be required.

Geography is primarily responsible for the present day importance of the island of Okinawa. Okinawa Gunto (the island of Okinawa and its nearby smaller satellites) comprises the central part of the Ryukyu Islands (commonly referred to in 1945 as Nansei Shoto.) The Ryukyu Islands form the central part of the great island barrier off the massive Asian continent's eastern littoral. This island barrier chain—Sakhalin and the Kuriles, the Japanese Islands, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Greater Sunda Islands—tend to militarily confine or secure the eastern Asian nations, and a great moat is provided by the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan, the East and South China Seas.

The central location of the island of Okinawa in this geographical setting is apparent from a brief examination of map or globe. Furthermore, within a 1200 mile radius of this "keystone" we find the Communist centers of Peiping, Vladivostok and the Liaotung peninsula. The Shanghai-Hangchow industrial complex is well within a 600 mile radius.

The island is about 68 miles long, with a width ranging from 3 to 12 miles. The northern two-thirds of the island is rugged, with hills rising to 1500 feet or more. The southern

portion is less rugged and contains most of the farming areas. Only about one-fifth of the island is in cultivation. The population is largely concentrated in the southern part of the island. Of the approximately 800,000 people in the Ryukyus, 690,000 live on Okinawa. The 2 "ports" used by Navy ships are Naha on the East China Sea, and White Beach on the Pacific side.

Okinawa is approximately the same latitude as Miami, Florida, (26 degrees north), and has something else in common with Miami—typhoons (hurricanes in Florida). Okinawa's tropical cyclones seem to be generally more destructive and there is an average of 2 per year that actually strike the island. The average temperature of the island is 71 degrees, the lowest on record is 41 degrees and the highest 96 degrees. This range appears wonderful for Chamber of Commerce purposes, but high humidity and heavy rainfall are principal characteristics of the island's climate. The green uniform is worn only 4 months of the year—November through March.

The cultural mores of the Ryukyuan people have sources as ancient as those of China and Japan. The ethics of Confucianism, the shrine worship of Shintoism, the philosophy of Taoism, and particularly the religion of Buddhism sometimes seem inextricably intermingled to form a matrix for present customs. The most apparent external trappings are the tombs and a lesser number of Shinto shrines. The large concrete lyre or rectangular shaped facades for tombs embedded in the hillsides are the most distinguishing feature of the Okinawan landscape. These tombs witness certain ceremonial acts of devotion, and they are the most inviolably out-of-bounds areas on the island.

The Ryukyuan economy is es-

entially agrarian, although fishing and other marine activities employ many people. Rice paddies sometimes seem commonplace; however, the island produces only half its requirement.


Since Okinawa is a densely populated agrarian area, land is a primary concern to the people. The past 2 decades of Japanese and American military conflict and occupation have necessarily displaced many of these people, and the administration of land is perhaps the most serious problem for US management. In early 1957, the High Commissioner issued Civil Ordinance No. 164, titled US Land Acquisition Program. This ordinance provides for the Armed Services' acquisition of essential areas for use as long as required while allowing title to remain with the landowner. This legal arrangement is called "determinable estate," and compensation is provided the landowner with a one-time lump-sum payment. The determinable estate/lump-sum payment program was promulgated only after long study; however, it is encountering determined opposition from some Okinawan groups.

The status of Okinawa as a showcase for democracy for all Asia must be impressed on all those serving here. In the words of a Congressional committee, it is a showcase for democracy "in its most precise sense." With the objective of impressing on all overseas Americans their duties to serve as ambassadors for their country, the President, in 1957, prescribed a "People-to-People" Program. Marine Corps Order 5710.1 amplifies this program for the Marine Corps. The opportunities for such a program on Okinawa are many, and the need for such is becoming increasingly apparent. We as individuals, and our government, should make a serious and studied effort to inject innovations and imagination in the continuing implementation of the People-to-People Program on Okinawa. If we lose the battle to make firm friends of the Ryukyans, we will have no one to blame but ourselves. Marine Corps Order 5710.1 provides an effective and simple formula for success in these matters: "Treat . . . foreign friends in a neighborly and dignified manner." US MC



SKYHOOK, RESCUE, MARINES... This horsecollar is a beautiful sight to a leatherneck who is floating around in the briny, or waiting rescue from the boondocks. It's a welcome sight especially because he knows there's a Marine Corps chopper on the other end. Having a rescue helicopter around is SOP with the Marines, and many a pilot has come back to fly again because the Corps takes such care of its own. Kaman helicopters have never graced Montezuma's halls, but they've been almost everywhere else...with the Marines.

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BGen
Greene

BGen
Hansen

MajGen
Gulick

MajGen
Roberts

MajGen
Lucky


MajGen
Paige

MajGen
Wornham

MajGen
Riseley

LtGen
McCaul

LtGen
Megee



OFFICERS ATTENDING THE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS

JUL 1958

Gen Heman	BGen Battell	BGen Howarth	BGen Hittle	BGen Fields	BGen Cloud
MajGen Shapley	MajGen Fay	MajGen Weller	BGen Allen	BGen Stickney	BGen Larson
LtGen Twining	LtGen Hogaboom	MajGen Ridgely	MajGen Jack	MajGen Munn	



DIVISION




2d Marine Division



Gen Julian C. Smith (center) congratulates Guinn Rasbury, newly elected president of the 2d Marine Division Association. BGen James Howarth, retiring president, looks on.



2d Division Members check in at the Shamrock.



Taps at Memorial Services.

✶ MARINES FROM 23 STATES ATTENDED the 2d Marine Division reunion at the Shamrock-Hilton Hotel in Houston, Texas July 17-20.

Elected president of the Association this year was Guinn Rasbury, a former WWII Marine now in business in Houston. He succeeded BGen James Howarth, Jr.

Other new officers elected this year were: Walter Borowski from Texas as Adjutant; Darrell Snelling from Illinois, First Vice President; Pete Pavel from Michigan, 2d Vice Presi-

dent; Bruno Tucci, California as 3d Vice President and John Hruska from Washington, 4th Vice President.

LtGen Julian C. Smith (Ret), wartime commander of the 2d Division attended the reunion as did Congressman Clark Thompson from Galveston, Texas.

A very special guest was Gen T. F. Gill, Air Commandant of New Zealand, who came to the reunion as representative of the New Zealand Ambassador to the US. Never, in the 9-year history of the Association has the Ambassador failed to attend or send a representative from his nation. The 2d Division was first assembled as a complete reinforced division in New Zealand during WWII.

Outstanding deeds were honored by awarding 2 lifetime memberships in the Association to parents of Texas Medal of Honor winners who died fighting with the 2d Division on Tarawa.

Recipients of the life memberships were Mrs. C. Jane Hawkins of El Paso for her son Bill Hawkins, and Mr. and Mrs. W. J. Bordelon of San Antonio for their son W. J. Bordelon, Jr.

REUNIONS



3d Marine Division

Marines of two famous WWII Divisions

met in Houston and New York to commemorate past

battles as a new crisis flared in the Mid-East



3d MarDiv Assn. Officers for 1958-59 — (L-R) Martin H. Peabody, Atlanta, Ga., Judge Advocate; Albert L. Jensen, San Diego, Cal., Executive Secretary; former Governor Sidney McMath, Little Rock, Ark., President; Edward A. Galiskis, New York, NY, Executive Vice-President and Douglas McKenzie, Fairlawn, N. J., Sergeant at Arms.

MEMBERS OF THE 3d MARDIV ASSOCIATION met in New York at the Hotel Roosevelt this year for their reunion.

Almost 200 members were registered but a greater number than this

attended the activities. There was good representation from all units of the war-time 3d as well as from units presently making up the Division.

Guest speaker was to have been LtGen R. E. Hogaboom but he could

not attend because of Marine Corps activities in the Middle East. The Hon. Sidney S. McMath, former Governor of Arkansas, acted as master of ceremonies and filled in for Gen Hogaboom. Honored guest for the meeting was Gen A. H. Turnage, USMC (Ret), wartime commanding general of the Division.

The business meeting on July 9th was well attended and after the regular business and election of officers a resolution was adopted which permits the president to appoint regional vice presidents rather than electing them at the business meeting.

Recreational activities included sightseeing trips to Radio City, a boat excursion, attendance at the Kansas City-Yankees baseball game as guests of Dan Topping, a cocktail party and reception and a luncheon with Lanny Ross acting as MC.

A memorial service was held at Yankee Stadium just prior to the baseball game.

After the meeting it was announced that next year's reunion would be held July 17, 18 and 19 at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D. C. Tom Stowe, a regional vice president, was named convention chairman.

This marks the second time the 3d MarDiv has picked the nation's capital for its reunion, the first having been held in D. C. in 1955.



the enduring work



By Col Victor J. Croizat

• ON THE 25TH OF JANUARY 1904, MR. HALFORD MACKINDER presented to the Royal Geographical Society one of the first papers by an Englishman in the field of geopolitics. This paper concluded that the "geographical pivot" of world power lay in the Eurasian landmass, generally in that area tenanted by Russia.

At the time that he presented this novel concept, Halford Mackinder was an instructor in geography at Oxford University and the Director of the London School of Economics and Political Science. His paper, based upon arguments deduced from careful appraisals of history and geography, was thus further supported by a creditable professional standing.

With the passage of time the words "geographical pivot" were to become the more familiar "heartland." The basic concept itself was to be adapted by the German Haushofer

Halford Mackinder

In light of present world tensions, this article concerning Mackinder's geopolitical concepts is particularly timely.

Figures 1 & 2: Courtesy of Professor S. B. Cohen




Fig. 1

and others, to endorse Adolf Hitler's schemes for Germanic aggrandizement. Yet, after more than 50 years, Mackinder's world has endured.

In 1942, Maj George Fielding Eliot, the American military writer, referred to this world when he wrote: "I have read this . . . with astonish-

ment, admiration and regret." The first reactions he attributed to the discovery of the lasting realism of the ideas, and his "regret" lay in what he considered to be the limited appreciation of such notable work.

Sir Winston Churchill, writing of the nineteenth century, mentions

the shadow of Russia "creeping over India" and he adds that the land of the Czar was looked upon as "the cornerstone of despotism in the world." In the Crimean War of the mid-century, England and France joined Turkey in thwarting for a time the Russian designs on Danu-



School and later at Epsom College, Oxford University, coincided with the years of expanding British wealth, prestige and strength. Like other Britons of his time he was aware that the glory of his empire was being supported and carried over the world by British sea power. Yet, the young man did not fail to observe the network of railroad lines spreading across Europe and the increasing significance of this cheap form of land transportation on the economy and military effectiveness of the affected states.

In 1890, the same year that the American naval officer, Alfred Thayer Mahan, published his brilliant treatise on the influence of sea power, Mackinder presented to the Scottish Geographical Society a paper which contained the germ of the ideas later to be developed into his memorable concept.

"Political geography," Mackinder told the assembled group, "seems to be founded on the fact that man travels and man settles." He added that while "travelling man seeks the lines of least resistance . . . settling man is mainly concerned with the productivity and security of tenure."

Mackinder recognized that the resistance of the physical features of the earth to travel or to settlement varied with the state of man's civilization. The sea had been a formidable barrier until the development of reliable ships. Now, he observed, the railroad was reducing the friction of land travel and was thus providing an ease of movement formerly enjoyed only on the seas.

In addressing himself to the map of the world, Mackinder noted that two thirds of the world's population was concentrated in only 2 areas: one he called the Gulf Stream Roman Area of Settlement, the other simply southeast Asia. He claimed that the productivity of these areas and the differences of their products provided the stimulus for East-West trade. In fact, he considered that history was nothing more than the story of this trade. His presentation concluded with the thought that: "The twin character of the world's civilization, Roman and Indo-Chinese is based upon 2 areas of settlement severed by the vacant desert. The narrow paths through the waste . . . are the homes of the oasis people, small in number . . . yet at once the

intermediaries and obstructives between East and West."

Admiral Mahan had clearly revealed in his writings an appreciation of the dependence of sea power upon a supporting land base. His studies in history led him to conclude that the size, population and productivity of the land base together with the related social and political factors were essential elements in the development of sea power. Mackinder agreed with Mahan in the intimacy of this relation between sea power and the land base, but when he looked to the future his views diverged.

Mackinder, citizen of the greatest naval power of his day, believed that cheap land transportation would inevitably balance the importance of sea power, and then land power would be capable of outflanking sea power.

Mahan, from a country which had for long turned its energies landward with consequent neglect of its maritime interests, argued that sea power would continue to be the dominant and decisive element of national greatness.

The record of history already contained much data to support Mackinder's ideas on the power relations of the future. As early as 1846, the Prussian VI Corps with all of its impedimenta had been moved a distance of 250 miles in 2 days. Without the railroad such an operation would have taken 2 weeks. The American Civil War, fought over a vast theater of operations, clearly demonstrated the vital importance of railroads in shifting decisive military power over great distances. In 1863, for example, a force of 23,000 men with their artillery and transport was moved 1,200 miles in 7 days: a creditable performance even today. Later, during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the concentration of the German Army by rail contributed in no small measure to the defeat of the French.

At the time that Mackinder was preparing his appreciation of the Russian power potential, history generously provided him with a graphic example of the new balance between sea power and land power. During the Boer War, Great Britain eventually had some 500,000 men in its South African field forces and these were supported — over 6,000

bian lands and the Black Sea. Thus by 1861, the year in which Mackinder was born, Russia was already established in Europe as an ambitious power, and one whose objectives were contrary to British interests.

Halford Mackinder's youth, first in the Gainsborough Grammar



Col Croizat was commissioned in the Marine Corps after graduating from Syracuse University in 1940. He commanded "A" Co, 1st AmphTracBn, and "M" Co, 3rd Bn, 5th Marines at Guadalcanal. He commanded the 10th AmphTracBn at Roi Namur, Saipan, Tinian and Iwo Jima. After attending the French War College in 1949 and 1950, he returned to Quantico where he instructed in the Tactics Section, Senior School. From 1954 to 1956, he served in Indochina.

miles of ocean—by naval power. The existence of this naval power also served to deter interested European countries from becoming too curious about this struggle.

In the same period Russia demonstrated that it too could support military operations at distances of thousands of miles; not by sea, but by land. When the Russo-Japanese War broke out in February 1904, Russia had an army of 100,000 men in the Far East. With the beginning of hostilities she began to move reinforcements eastward at the rate of 30,000 per month over the single rail line of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. It has been estimated that Russia applied only about 10 per cent of her military potential in this war; had she done more the result might have been different. The modest Russian effort alone was enough to cause the Japanese to strain to their utmost their capabilities in order to attain eventual victory.

The beginning of the twentieth century coincided with the end of British imperial expansion. Exploration and conquest were largely done. Henceforth, instead of looking primarily across the broad sweep of the world's seas, Great Britain would look upon herself more and more as an integral part of continental Europe. Mackinder recognized this trend and when he addressed the Royal Geographical Society in 1904 he spoke of the beginning of this new era in these terms: "Every explosion of social forces, instead of being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos will be sharply reechoed from the far side of the globe. . . . Probably some half consciousness of this fact is at least diverting much of the attention of statesmen in all parts of the world from territorial expansion to struggles for relative efficiency."


After this acknowledgement of the then current state of affairs, Mackinder proceeded to unfold the geographic and historic background in front of which he intended to develop his theme of world power relations.

"Europe," he claimed, achieved its civilization, "under pressure of external barbarism" and more specifically

in its, "secular struggle against Asiatic invasion." He did not discount the effect of Viking raids along the coastal areas, but to these incursions he did not attach the same significance as he did to the eastward movements of the horsemen across Asia.

Mackinder noted that a vast land containing some 21 million square miles extended from western Europe to Asia. This area had rivers that drained either to the frozen oceans of the north or to land locked seas in the south. Thus, for all purposes of external communication, this mass of Eurasia was cut off from access to the sea . . . it was an area well suited to nomads.

In the Middle Ages, Western Europe began to use the seas to emerge



upon the world. Eventually it was to multiply thirty-fold the coasts and seas to which it had access. At the same time Russia was moving overland toward the south, consolidating her position as a great land power. Now the development of easy land travel was giving to a country isolated from the sea, the power formerly reserved only to maritime nations. Mackinder then asked: "Is not the pivot region of the world's politics that vast area of Euro-Asia which is inaccessible to ships, but in antiquity lay open to the horse riding nomads, and is today about to be covered with a network of railroads?" In reply to his question, he pointed out that Russia now replaced the Mongol Empire and had in its land "the conditions of a mobility of military and economic

power of a far reaching and yet limited character."

Mackinder believed that if the pivot state were to gain access over the marginal lands of Eurasia it could use its resources to build the naval power which would ultimately give it the control of the world. In his final remarks he cautioned: "Were the Chinese . . . to overthrow the Russian Empire and conquer its territory . . . they would add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent, an advantage as yet denied to the Russian tenant of the pivot region."

History has turned full circle. First when the seas marked the edges of the world there was the pattern of great powers such as the Chinese and the Roman deriving their strength from control of large land

masses. Then when man conquered his fears and moved out upon the seas he found that control of this medium facilitated his commerce and simplified the application of military power. Now land power had regained its former importance and was capable of challenging sea power on vastly improved terms.

In the 15 years that followed the publication of Mackinder's "pivot area" concept the world passed through the cataclysm of a great war. Mackinder spent most of these years as a member of Parliament from the Camlachie Division, Glasgow. This vantage point, together with continuing interest in geographical and economic matters, enabled him to review and refine his original concept in the light of changing centers of power and the new transportation




Fig. 2

devices: the truck and the aeroplane.

In 1919 he published *Democratic Ideals and Reality* in which he elaborated with considerable detail his earlier ideas and slightly modified his concept of the Heartland. This book contains the matured thoughts of Mackinder on the realities of power relations and he suggests how statesmen may use these realities in determining the future . . . the task which was then about to be undertaken. A measure of the merit of this book lies in the fact that a 1942 edition was published with no change and was endorsed by Edward M. Earle and Maj George Fielding Eliot, both well known writers on military subjects.

In the elaboration of his theme on world power relationships, Mackinder had some interesting views on aviation.

Speaking of an aviation still in the early stages of 1919, Mackinder stated that, "sea power will use the waterway of the Mediterranean and Red Sea only by the sufferance of land power, for air power is chiefly an arm of land power." Today of course the range of aircraft has been vastly extended both by the development of the aeroplane itself and by the utilization of the naval carrier. Nevertheless the essential accuracy of this remark, concerned with the control over communication on land or sea which air can exercise, remains.

Writing of North America, Mackinder claimed that the term "New World" implied a "wrong perspective" for this continent was "now shrinking to be an island." He added that there was a remarkable parallelism between the history of England and that of America. "Both countries have now passed through the same succession of Colonial, Continental and Insular Stages." Finally he told Americans that they "must no longer think of Europe apart from Asia and Africa."

In describing the extent of what he now termed the Heartland (Fig. 1) Mackinder restated his basic definition: that this area was inaccessible to navigation from the ocean and added that: "The opening of it by railways . . . and by aeroplane routes in the near future, constitutes a revolution in the relation of men to the larger geographical realities of the world."

In his original concept presented in 1904, Mackinder described the geographical pivot area as being exclusive of the Black and Baltic Seas. Now he claimed that land power could close both of these seas and therefore they rightfully belonged in the Heartland. Thus he concluded: "The Heartland is the region to which sea power can be refused access, though the western part of it lies without the region of Arctic and continental drainage."

In the further analysis of the Heartland, Mackinder stated that only in recent years had this area possessed the manpower to actually constitute a threat to the liberty of the world. In this context he referred to the Heartland as, "this citadel of the World Island." Here may be the clue revealing the reason for his change in the boundaries of the Heartland from those he used when he described the pivot area. In 1904 the pivot area was one of movement; a zone of fluid forces with no need for carefully prescribed limits. Now, in 1919, he spoke of the Heartland as a citadel. This implied an expanse with finite boundaries based upon identifiable terrain features; an area containing elements of power with a large population and resources.

After defining the geographical units of his world, which had been developed from a survey of early history, Mackinder proceeded to discuss the effect of recent events on the areas he had defined. Here he stated: ". . . we have come to the conclusion that the World Island and the Heartland are the final realities in regard to sea power and land power, and that East Europe is essentially part of the Heartland."

The essence of strategy he then summarized in the well known dictum:

"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;

Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island;

Who rules the World Island commands the World."

The first Great War, although best remembered for the violent and prolonged agonies on its Western Front, was in fact a struggle for Eastern Europe . . . a continuation of the historic struggle between the German and the Slav to determine

who would gain control of the Heartland. Mackinder believed that unless this conflict were resolved "our descendants will find themselves under the necessity of marshaling their power afresh for the siege of the Heartland."

Mackinder considered that the *casus belli* in Eastern Europe could be eliminated by the creation of a tier of states between Russia and Germany. This was an echo of the British buffer state policy of the previous century when the problem had been to keep Russia from absorbing segments of the disintegrating Turkish Empire. The world has since discovered that Hitler was not discouraged by the independent states created at Versailles. Today, after a second Great War the German question as part of the buffer state system is perhaps the most troublesome of the many problems confronting the Communist and Free Worlds.

The inclusion of the Black and Baltic Seas within the Heartland gave to the tenant power the capability of developing naval forces on these seas which could then be unleashed over the oceans of the world. To avoid this possibility Mackinder proposed that the exits to these seas, the Dardanelles and the Skaggerak, should be internationalized. This has not been done, but the inclusion of Denmark and Turkey within the alliance of North Atlantic States has placed these vital areas under control of the free west.

Just after the publication of his book, Mackinder departed for Russia to become the British High Commissioner for the Southern Area. Upon his return to England in 1920 he was knighted and later named Chairman of the Imperial Shipping Committee. In a few years he also became the Chairman of the Imperial Economic Committee.

In 1943, just 4 years before his death, Halford Mackinder was asked by the magazine *Foreign Affairs* to review and comment on the Heartland concept. In his reply Mackinder modified the boundaries of the Heartland (Fig. 2) and discarded his 1919 dictum in favor of according an increased importance to the coastal or Rimland area.

When he spoke of air power he confessed that it had become an important element of national greatness. He added that air power was

like sea power in that its effectiveness depended largely upon the quality of the supporting ground organization. Mackinder concluded his review with the thought that the Heartland as a "citadel of power," the idea he had advanced in 1919, remained valid in 1943.

The ideas that Mackinder developed, elaborated and expounded in his long and vigorous lifetime were of such significance that they invited criticism and comment from many sources.

Nicholas Spykman considered that the importance of the Heartland was suggested to Mackinder by his appreciation of the advantage of a central position with interior lines of communication.

Spykman cautioned that even with motor vehicle roads, the railroad and the aeroplane, the Heartland was ringed on 3 sides with some of the greatest transportation obstacles in the world. In his analysis of the Rimland, a word which he coined, Spykman called it a "vast buffer zone of conflict between land power and sea power" and added that the Rimland must defend itself from both the Heartland and the off-shore islands. He concluded that "its amphibious nature" lies at the basis of its security problems."

In continuing his remarks on Mackinder's concepts, Spykman pointed out that there never has been "a simple land power - sea power opposition." Spykman emphasized the importance of the Rimland . . . the "buffer zone" of "amphibious nature" and ended his analysis with the remark that: "If there is to be a slogan for the power politics of the Old World it must be: 'Who con-

trols the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world'."

It is apparent that Mackinder did not consider his ideas as static or rigid, since he changed them at several writings. If he were still alive today he would admit that recent developments had again influenced him and that fresh modifications to his writings were in order. In the final analysis the enduring quality of Mackinder's works lies in the fundamental significance of the ideas he advanced, rather than in the merit of the details with which he embellished his thoughts.

Soviet Russia represents today one of the most formidable powers that the world has ever seen. When Mackinder recognized Russia's politics of expansion he was not uncovering something new; Russian imperialism had been around for several hundred years. When he emphasized the tremendous power potential of Russia he was again only reaffirming what others had said. The thing that Mackinder did which was new, was to take the evidence of history and the facts of geography, sift and organize this mass of information, and end up with a simple concept which contained the reasons for Russian imperialism and the sources of Russian power.

Mackinder is also largely responsible for setting forth the bases for the policy of containment which has been guiding US international affairs for over 10 years. Mackinder made a very plausible case for the balance between sea power and land power. The way to keep Russia, as a great land power, from becoming mistress of the world, was to keep

her from gaining access to the oceans of the world; hence containment. It is because of the emphasis on this containment that Mackinder came to view in later years the coastal areas, or Rimland, as being of increasing importance. This was the Zone of Action; this was the area whose possession would determine the balance of power.

In one of his earliest writings Mackinder had accurately stated that the resistance of the earth's physical features to man's activities, varied with the state of his civilization. Now the modern aeroplane and the icebreaker have combined to gain for Russia an increased usefulness of her polar seas. The barrier effect of these seas is thus being lessened as man develops his technology. But, aside from this, Russia has already reached the world's oceans. She has bases on the Pacific and Fleets on the Baltic and Black Seas. These last can gain access to the open seas with only little military effort. Thus Russia has been able to add to its land power, important reinforcing elements of sea power. She is on the way toward attaining that combination of powers which Mackinder stated would make for domination of the world.

The US can gain little by attempting to oppose Russian land power with an equal land power. Yet, traditional Russian imperialism must be stopped. This can be done, first through a combination of sea power and airpower capable of denying to Russia the seas of the world, and second, through the maintenance of the capability to exploit what Spykman called "The amphibious nature" of the Rimland. US MC



Team Shooter . . .

FMFPAC's headquarters building at Camp H. M. Smith in Hawaii also houses CINCPAC's joint staff consisting of Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force personnel.

Recently while waiting to board an elevator in the basement of the building, I stood fast while an Army Major entered. I followed and pressed the button for the fourth floor. The Major and I talked amiably up to the third floor when the door opened and a Marine Corporal armed with an M-1 and wearing a shooting jacket walked in.

"Who are you going to shoot, Corporal?" the Major asked.

"Gonna beat the Army team at Hilo, Sir," was the NCO's reply.

"Are you a team shooter?" asked the Major.

"No, Sir," came the reply. "Just a Marine."

MSgt R. B. Richardson

Golf Minus Ten

By LtCol H. W. Edwards

Golf-Hour is the hour that helicopters leave the landing zone; it may or may not be the hour that the landing zone is secured.



A RECENT TRAINING EXERCISE concluded that the employment of a helicopter-borne force to seize an objective in enemy-held territory must provide for last minute reconnaissance of the proposed landing areas. If we accept this as a requirement, how is it to be accomplished

and what effect will it have on the surprise and shock power of our helicopter landing?

True, in some cases such reconnaissance can be accomplished by surveillance from fixed wing aircraft with no requirement for personnel to be landed. In other situations a

few paratroops can be dropped, without protection, to make a covert reconnaissance. But the means which appear to offer the greatest prospect for success involve the employment of an advance party containing, primarily, elements of the ground unit to be landed and the

aviation unit furnishing the lift. This advance echelon may operate as an echelon of the Helicopter Support Team since that organization is already established for support of helicopter operations and can be expanded to include certain tactical functions in addition to its present logistical duties.

Such advance operations are for the purpose of performing necessary reconnaissance, confirming feasibility of preselected landing areas, establishing necessary communication and landing aids. The time needed will vary depending on the number of personnel employed, means of delivery, enemy situation, terrain and weather. In the event that advance operations will compromise security of the operation, these personnel may accompany the first wave of the main force and conduct their operations simultaneously. The determination of whether such advance operations are conducted, at what time and to what extent, will be made by the commander in his estimate of the situation when the operation is being planned. In some situations a small party will be employed just a few minutes ahead of the main landing, in others a larger force some time ahead, and in some cases none at all.

While the composition of the force would vary it should generally include:

- a) Security personnel from the unit being lifted.
- b) Reconnaissance personnel from the Division Reconnaissance Battalion or Force Reconnaissance Company.
- c) Landing zone control party personnel furnished by the unit providing the lift.
- d) HST personnel furnished by Landing Support Companies or BLT service platoons.
- e) Pathfinder teams and pathfinder helicopters furnished by the unit supplying the lift.

When required, the advance party of an HST will normally be organized by the tactical organization being lifted, and its size and composition will be governed by a number of considerations: the size and nature of the operation, the terrain comprising the landing area, enemy opposition anticipated, defensibility of the area, the specific tasks assigned by the commander and the

length of time by which the unit precedes the assault force. It must be large enough to accomplish its mission yet small enough to require a minimum number of helicopters, so as not to alert enemy forces as to the location of the landing in time to influence the action. In ship-to-shore operations where the advance party consists of parachute pathfinders, advance operations would be organized and controlled by the highest echelon.

The advance party commander will be in overall charge of the force which will operate among the various landing sites comprising the landing zone. He will be from the tactical unit being landed or the next higher echelon and should be an officer of experience and sound tactical judgement.

The helicopter control personnel will constitute a pathfinder team. The number of individuals for an advance party again will be at a minimum, but will be tailored to the particular situation in the interest of adequate personnel for the job of guidance of helicopters, determination of the condition of the landing zones for helicopter landing, and establishment and operation of signal devices for the purpose of guiding succeeding helicopters to the landing zone. Such teams will be from the helicopter unit furnishing the lift or from the Force Recon Co. when one is available, and will be a part of the Landing Zone Control organization, which in turn may be a component of the HST.

Pathfinder aircraft are aircraft especially equipped with devices which facilitate pin point navigation, manned by crews well trained in navigation. They are used in transporting personnel of the HST advance party to landing zones and can also be used for guiding subsequent waves of aircraft to the prop-

er destination. In Army-Air Force airborne operations they habitually are fixed wing aircraft which deliver the personnel and equipment by parachute. Marine Corps doctrine envisions delivery of such personnel by helicopters or parachute, in which case fixed wing pathfinder aircraft might be needed to lead the pathfinder transport helicopters to the landing zones. It is probable that similar aircraft will be needed for guiding subsequent waves to their destinations. In some situations when the landing zones are close to the beach, amphibious recon patrols may be used to carry out advance party functions.

In the interest of preserving surprise, the number of personnel in an advance party will normally be kept to a minimum. Functions performed and major items of equipment will usually include the following:

- a) The rapid reconnaissance of the landing zone by scouts and pioneers to determine the degree of enemy opposition and obstructions and hazards to landing.
- b) Communication personnel to establish an internal command net among the several landing sites involved, and 2 helicopter direction nets. This equipment will be AN/GRC-9, AN/PRC-22 and AN/PRC-10; operators will normally be from the landing zone control party of the HST.
- c) The monitoring and detection of radiation in the landing area by means of lowering instruments from hovering helicopters and then on the ground when the area is determined to be "safe." The monitors may check a few landing sites for an average reading or check every site. Considering the time available and the number of sites to be used, probably the best system will consist of checking 2 or 3 sites within a land-



LtCol Edwards entered the Marine Corps in 1941, after graduating from the University of Minnesota. He has served in many assignments during his career, including: CO, MD, American Embassy, London; Instructor, TTUPac, Coronado; I&I, 14th Inf Bn, Houston, Texas; CO, 3d Bn, 7th Marines; Head, Historical Branch, HQMC; Asst G-3, 1st Mar Div. He is presently in transit to a new assignment in Japan.

ing zone. Upon completing this mission, monitors can perform other functions as assigned.

d) Personnel may also be needed for marking or clearing of obstacles and general preparation of the area to receive helicopters. Some engineer personnel, for mine detection, may be required for this job. If the sites have not been cleared of mines and trip wires by an atomic preparation, a careful examination of the site might be required. If it develops that the landing will be unopposed, advance party personnel can be used in marking the landing zone, clearing obstructions, and assisting the prompt assembly of troops as they land; normal HST functions.

e) Miscellaneous tasks such as the placement of marking panels or lights for visual identification.

The commander of the advance party may have the important task of confirming the feasibility of landing the helicopter-borne force in the area selected in accordance with the landing schedule established. This evaluation is an important factor bearing on final decisions relative to execution of the helicopter movement as planned, and must be communicated back to the commander as soon as possible. He will preferably be from the ground force being lifted and an officer of experience who can quickly size up the situation to determine whether there is a likelihood of substantial enemy interference during the period of the landing and the degree of that interference. He may execute his duties from the air where he can see over the entire area and evaluate the situation in the shortest time. It is quite probable that the commander or staff officer of the initial unit that is to be landed will himself be airborne, in a free helicopter or fixed wing aircraft, to participate in the decision. Certainly the decision is an important one and must be made in minimum time in order to capitalize on a surprise effect. Inasmuch as a change from a primary to an alternate landing zone affects such things as plans for a juncture force or the capability of supporting arms to shift fires, the operation order must clearly set forth the conditions under which the switch in landing zones can be made, and the level of command authorized to direct this change.

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
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
12 tube rocket launcher on full track




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
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
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
Tactical missile—estimated range: 400-500 miles




Missile mounted on amphibious vehicle—estimated range: 15 miles




Missile provided with hydraulic lifting device and vertical launching platform



This missile has warming jacket for extreme cold—estimated range: 50 miles



Truck mounted launcher fires missile 17 feet long



Two stage SAM



A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO MORAL LEADERSHIP

FMFPAC, TWENTYNINE PALMS—

Now that Navy Department General Order 21 has been published, and the problems and importance of moral leadership have been reemphasized, it is appropriate for all Marine officers and senior NCOs to seek practical ways of implementing this admittedly vital program. Every practical program must have a starting point—a point of solid fact on which to base the effort to be made, and in this problem area we are likely to find the most confusion. Actually, as we all know, moral leadership, and leadership in general are not new—they have been with us for centuries. But I think that those intellectually honest readers must agree that moral leadership programs have become perfunctory and stilted, to say the least.

To discuss the basis for implementing a sound program, we must examine 3 facts of life. The first of these is that no 2 commands are alike, even though they are both operating under the same table of organization. Each level, from platoon to division varies because it is made up, no matter how small or large, of people, and people are different. The second fact is that each program of moral leadership *must be tailored to the needs of the particular unit*, if it is to reach maximum effectiveness. Since we have agreed that units and commands differ because their people are different, it should logically follow that no single program will adequately reach each unit.

Most important to remember, though it should be without ques-

tion, is the third simple fact that in moral leadership you are attempting to reach people as individuals—and that the only common purpose served is that when all, or a majority of the individuals are influenced, then and only then will the unit or command benefit.

We have 3 basic points: 1) That no 2 units are alike; 2) That no single program will fit these dissimilar units' needs; 3) That to be effective we must reach people as individuals. Now, gentlemen, we can get to work! We can use these 3 ideas as our starting point. To tailor a program for maximum effectiveness we must first examine the people that make up a unit, and then examine the unit as a whole. So let's pull up our sleeves and propose some practical steps.

Step I: Command or Unit Evaluation (including source of information)

a) From personnel records, get the following: Total numbers of men in each following category.

- 1) Single under 21
- 2) Married under 21
- 3) Single over 21
- 4) Married over 21

b) From personnel and punishment records, determine the following:

- 1) For the past 12 months, number of offenses by article
- 2) Number of cases handled at mast
- 3) Number of cases referred to court martial
- 4) Number of administrative separations (unfit, undesirable, etc.)
- 5) Record any civil violations reported to command, by type, e.g., speeding, drunkenness, etc.

- 6) *Most important*, relate all offenses recorded above to age groups a) 1 to 4 above.
- c) From the chaplains of *all* faiths aboard (without betraying any confidences):
 - 1) Average church attendance by men of your unit.
 - 2) Any common or unusual problems that have come to their attention, particularly relevant to morale.
 - 3) Counseling problems by type and frequency, e.g., premarital, financial, divorce, etc.
 - 4) Number of men, according to records, who profess a particular faith.
- d) From Navy Relief and Red Cross representatives.
 - 1) Reasons for loan or assistance requests by type, e.g., illness, accident, etc.
- e) From Medical Records.
 - 1) Frequency of VD by type and age.
- f) From Education officer.
 - 1) Number of men, by age group with no high school, 1-2 years of high school, 2-4 years of high school, more than 4 years high school.
 - 2) Number of men enrolled in correspondence courses by type of course, academic, military, functional.
- g) Tabulate GCT scores.
- h) From personal observation.
 - 1) Morale of subordinate units.
 - 2) Appearance of subordinate units.
 - 3) Grades of subordinate units in past administrative or IG inspections.
 - 4) Percentage of subordinate units who passed promotion examinations, relative to number eligible.

This looks like a large order, but in actual practice, for a battalion size unit, all this information is available and can be put together in a matter of a few days.

Step II: Now then, we have gotten a mass of uncoordinated material and we find ourselves up to our ears in statistics—of course—you guessed

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it, let's analyze what we have. There really was a purpose in digging up all the dope. By simple correlation of offenses with information in paragraph a) 1 to 4 you have a good idea of the group that needs the most help, and in what problem areas that assistance is required. A complete study of *all* the facts you have assembled will lead to just one conclusion. You now know where to start, and where your main effort must be made. So get to work — time's a'wastin'!

LtCol C. A. Lipot

STRONGBACK AND RADIO RELAY

HQ, FMFPAC — Articles (GAZETTE: Oct '57; Mar '58) on radio relay have performed a much needed service, that of furthering the education of all Marines in our primary means of communications for modern amphibious warfare. However, I believe some points made in the articles require greater emphasis.

Both articles ended with, "The day will come when the communicators are not red faced at the critique." That day has now arrived. At the critique of exercise STRONGBACK, the Amphibious Troops Commander, stated, "I can say without reservations that communications were better than I have ever witnessed and I have taken part in several operations both during peace and war. . . . Radio relay is here to stay." The General hit the nail right on the head when he said radio relay is here to stay. We could not conduct modern amphibious operations without it. WWII type wire trunks could never have been installed for STRONGBACK. Not only because of time and space factors, but also because of rugged terrain obstacles and enemy forces (aggressors) located between friendly units. Relays were used chiefly to feed the signal around terrain obstacles rather than to increase distance range. For example, in a 112 mile circuit between the MEF flagship and a MAG, the following equipment was used: Four relays were required to transmit the signal 30 miles from the flagship, through a pass in the mountains, up the river valley for a clear shot across a central plain. The 75-

mile direct shot across the central plain was made with no relays. This long range direct circuit bears out Capt Green's and Lt Fullinwider's explanation of radio wave propagation.

The main reason for the success of radio relay was that its 2 chief limitations, availability of frequencies and equipment, did not exist. These and other significant limitations listed below are either temporary in nature, or will not exist in time of war.

FREQUENCY LIMITATIONS. Our present interim equipment (AN/MRC-62, 63, and AN/GRC-10 — all are basically the same set), operates in the 54 to 70.9 mcs frequency band, but unfortunately these same frequencies are also used for TV. Channel 2 uses 54-60 mcs; channel 3, 60-66 mcs; and channel 4, 66-72 mcs. In almost every amphibious exercise in which the Marine Corps participates, the employment of radio is severely limited because of TV interference. Provisional equipment (AN/MRC-59, 60, and AN/TRC-27 — again all are basically the same set), is due in FY59 and operates in fairly clear bands so little or no interference is anticipated.

LIMITATIONS IN AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT. Provisional T/E's provide radio relay down to and including Bn's, MACS's and MASS's. MABS's should have an allowance if MAG's are to operate at airfields remote from the TACC. However, the T/E equipment will not be available until FY59, and the present interim equipment cannot be employed in most exercises, or its use is severely restricted, because of the frequency limitations mentioned above.

Units participating in STRONGBACK were organized under the L-series and did not rate as much equipment as the Provisional series provide. However, obsolescent WWII equipment, carried as a Class IV training allowance, was pressed into service and partially made up for the difference between the L and Provisional allowances.

PROPAGATION LIMITATIONS. The March radio relay article gave a good account of propagation for radio relay equipment. One of the reasons why present equipment has a greater range than the Provisional

T/E equipment is its propagation characteristics. Since it has a greater range, the present equipment should be retained as Class IV.

Radio relay now carries the bulk of our communications just as wire carried the bulk of our WWII and Korean communications. The advantages of radio relay over wire are tremendous. It takes less time to install; provides better quality circuits (no more shouting into the EE-8); provides increased distance range; spans terrain obstacles such as rivers, swamps and mountains which in most cases cannot be covered by wire; crosses enemy held terrain; takes fewer personnel to install, maintain and operate; reduces logistic support; is more dependable and flexible; and is much less susceptible to enemy fire (and friendly vehicles).

Yes, there are limitations to radio relay, but we have the means to overcome the really significant limitations. To me the communication picture never looked brighter.

LtCol John J. Reber

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Naval Gunfire

✻ With every passing day we see more and more disagreements about what preparations should be made for the war of the future. These disagreements arise from different theories about what the war of the future will be like. There are those who maintain that it must be a war of atomic holocaust, using the biggest and the most lethal atomic and hydrogen weapons; others contend that for self preservation it must be a limited atomic war, using only tactical atomic weapons, small yield stuff designed to obliterate only the fighting forces on the battlefield. The most moderate of all, hold the position that atomic weapons will follow the route of poison gas and will be relegated to storehouses throughout the world, only to be used if and when . . .

This theorizing about what kind of war will be fought imposes upon the Armed Forces of the US the difficult task of making preparations to wage any type of war. To solve this problem, it has generally been accepted that plans and preparations will be made for an atomic war, but it is stipulated that these plans and preparations must be adaptable to the so-called conventional war. Following these lines, the Marine Corps has been engaged in extensive planning, experimenting and testing to determine how an amphibious operation in an atomic war will be conducted. As this new theory of amphibious operations is being developed, however, the Marine Corps retains its ability and skill to land in the conventional manner.



and the

ATOM

By Maj Harold D. Fredericks

Will naval gunfire support be possible in an atomic war?

If so, what form will it take?





Close Air Support

One small aspect of this problem which I would like to discuss is the naval gunfire support available during an amphibious operation, when our enemy has chosen to employ atomic weapons. What I shall say here will be a theory, not a solution. My hope is that my theorizing will lead others to evolve solutions which may make naval gunfire planning in an atomic war easier to accomplish. This theory will apply if the war is an all-out atomic effort or a limited atomic action.

However, before we consider naval gunfire planning, perhaps it might be well for us to examine some of the other characteristics of amphibious operations in an atomic war so that we might better understand the problem.

Strangely enough, our first consideration must be a defensive one. We must consider the lethal effects of the atomic weapon and realize that one such weapon could destroy our entire landing force if we were to land as we did in WWII. To offset the effect of a nominal sized bomb, it has now been generally recognized that the minimum safe

distance between battalions is a mile and a half. However, experimentation has been conducted to determine the feasibility of having assault battalions operate as far as 20 miles apart.

This defensive separation between battalions imposes on us our second consideration—the necessity of being able to shift rapidly so that we may be able to mass more than one battalion when a critical situation arises, or when we are ready to seize an objective which requires greater strength. In other words, we must be able to keep our forces separated, then rapidly converge them and then separate them again. All of this requires us to have mobility.

The Marine Corps envisions using the helicopter to transport the assault troops deep inland. Although this eliminates landing beaches of the WWII vintage, beaches would still be necessary to land certain follow-up troops. The important point to remember for purposes of naval gunfire, however, is that the assault elements will be landed primarily by helicopter.

This extensive use of helicopters

to seize inland objectives poses a supporting arms problem. As a step in solving this problem the new organization of the MarDiv supplies the combat troops with light artillery or mortars, replacing the cumbersome 155mm howitzers once found in division artillery regiments. These light pieces will be helicopter transportable.

It is also envisioned in the way of support that extensive air cover will be necessary. This is so for a number of reasons. We must first again consider defensive aspects. A successful amphibious operation in an atomic war is impossible to achieve unless there is complete air superiority within a certain range of the objective area. In order to achieve this complete air superiority, there will, of course, have to be more airplanes. In addition, since the initial objectives will be so far inland and since the units will be spread so far apart, it is envisioned that there will be need for more extensive air strikes against enemy ground forces and installations, since this is the only weapon which initially will be able to see the enemy on his home ground.

And in very concise form those are the salient features which must be borne in mind when evaluating the role of naval gunfire support in an amphibious operation of the atomic era: separation, mobility, lighter organic supporting arms and more air cover.

In light of all these, the question which first comes to mind is whether or not naval gunfire support will even be possible in an atomic war.



If it is possible, what form shall it take?

These questions arise because we are prone to consider naval gunfire support only as it was employed in previous operations. It has been almost always SOP to have a destroyer in direct support of each assault infantry battalion. To bolster the powerful fires of the destroyer, light or heavy cruisers were usually placed in general support of a regiment. As further back-up, the division had heavy cruisers and battleships in general support.

This system of allocating fire support shipping was devised so that one battalion could receive the fires not only from its own direct support destroyer but, if the situation were serious enough, fire support from all the ships in general support of the regiment and division. It was an extremely flexible and workable system for a landing of the WWII type; but as we shall see, this type of support may not be possible in the amphibious operation of the future. In planning naval gunfire support, however, we should strive to retain the characteristic of flexibility which this system embodied.

As we mentioned in preceding paragraphs, our infantry battalions will be widely separated and some of our assault battalions will make their initial assault miles inland. Will these battalions be able to be adequately supported by destroyers in direct support roles? In many cases the answer will be, unfortunately, *no*. Even in those situations where destroyers can be used in direct support roles, it is easy to foresee how their use will be seriously limited. The reason we must rule out the destroyer as our direct support ship is based on range. Since the range of the 5" battery of the destroyer is 15,000 yards and since we foresee our assault battalions initially landing as far inland as 10 miles (and perhaps even farther with new helicopters) we can easily understand how destroyers would be unable to render us support. Even when battalions land over the beaches we can anticipate that because of the heavy atomic preparation they will be able to progress inland rapidly, and consequently will soon outdistance the range of the reliable destroyer.

And so we must conclude that a destroyer, with its present armament, will not be able to render direct support to our assault battalions in an atomic war. Must we therefore rule out naval gunfire in a direct support role? The answer is a resounding *no*. Not only must we not rule it out, but we must be ever insistent that we have the necessary direct support ships, for they are as vital in an atomic war as they ever were in a conventional war.

We must remember that the basic characteristic of an amphibious landing has not changed. It is still the most difficult type of operation to conduct. This is true not only because amphibious landing requires elaborate planning to achieve correct timing, support, etc., but primarily because it is one of the few operations (together with air borne landings) that requires fighting forces to be built up, from nothing to an effective overpowering force. It also creates the requirement that all support initially come from sources outside the landing force.

It is this last requirement which causes us to insist that naval shipping be available to give direct support. For as we all undoubtedly know, there are only 2 major sources of support which come from out-

side the landing force—naval gunfire and air. Air, as we mentioned before, is taking on a larger and larger role in rendering support. There are those who maintain that the day is near at hand when each assault battalion will be supported by a squadron of attack aircraft. However, even our most ardent exponents of air power must admit that there will be circumstances of weather and operations that will prohibit air from rendering continuous support. Therefore, naval gunfire remains one of the principal supporting arms in the initial stages of an amphibious operation.

Nor is it sufficient to say that this naval gunfire may simply be in a general support role since we have already decided that destroyers will be inadequate for direct support. There is still the requirement, as before, that in the early stages of the landing, our assault battalions have at their fingertips (or at least no farther away than the other end of their radio) a ready supply of naval gunfire. Despite atomic preparation, we must still give the enemy the capability of mustering a powerful force; and we must have the assurance that naval gunfire will be available to the battalion when it needs it, to help repel such a force.

Marines assault from HR2S



A direct support ship is therefore mandatory.

But what can we use as a direct support vessel? Would not light and heavy cruisers fulfill this role? The range of the 8" guns may be just what the tactician ordered in an amphibious operation. Granted that cruisers are not in as plentiful supply as destroyers, but it is hoped that enough of them can be made available to act as direct support ships. Moreover, there is still the possibility of employing destroyers in some situations; and they certainly should be used whenever practicable.


Since we are using cruisers for direct support, should we then advance our whole system of allocation of shipping and use battleships in general support? If we answered in

ployed as a supporting arm in many situations where naval gunfire was formerly used.

However, in the field of guided missiles we have a virgin expanse in which to let our imaginations run rampant, for the Navy has invested much in the way of men, money and material in its guided missile program. Although much of the information about guided missiles is classified, I think we can safely conclude that Navy missiles are being tested, developed and produced which have the capability of striking targets deep inland. Exactly what their present capabilities or future potentialities are makes little difference, for the salient feature to remember about guided missiles for the purposes of this article is that they have a much greater range (i.e.

shifts of firing positions will mean that this ship must have the capability of firing very long ranges—longer than those we are now familiar with. Therefore, guided missiles are the logical choice. These missiles, supplementing our increased air support, should be able to do the job quite well.

We admit that we have been speaking in generalities. We have not examined the detailed planning and analysis necessary for the successful executions of NGF support. We don't believe that this examination is necessary. Fire planning will still be based upon the same principles—so many rounds to so many square feet of ground to achieve neutralization—so many rounds to achieve destruction against various types of installations. Granted that



Cruiser lays down fire

the affirmative, we would be guilty of failure to keep up with the times, for the Navy has retired its battleships. Nor are heavy cruisers the answer because they are not available in sufficient numbers. Therefore, let us examine the entire array of naval shipping and perhaps we might find something to suit our purposes. We have but to look at the fields in which the Navy has been concentrating its research efforts lately and we find the answer to our general support problem. The Navy's emphasis in recent years has been on 2 major programs—air and guided missile.

We have already mentioned aviation, and we admit that if aviation is capable of evolving an around-the-clock, all-weather capability for ground support, planes will be em-

Regulus—600 miles) than what we might term conventional naval gunfire and that they will have a good degree of accuracy. Furthermore, if we can believe what we read in the newspaper, these guided missiles will be fired from all types of naval shipping—submarines, cruisers, destroyers and probably, if circumstances warrant, other type shipping.

Therefore, instead of saying that a certain type of ship will be in general support, let us just say that guided missiles will be in general support. Actually, this becomes an ideal naval gunfire general support weapon because, as we have mentioned before, our battalions will be pretty well separated in a nuclear war; and for a ship to render general support capable of supporting 3, 6 or 9 of them without major

there must be adjustment made for the use of atomic weapons, but this is old stuff to naval gunfire planners. Computing the number of rounds necessary to achieve certain missions evolves into nothing more than a mathematical process.


There is but one other possible major change which will take place during the nuclear war, and this is the elimination of pre-D-Day bombardments. Assuming that our amphibious task forces will employ atomic weapons to precede the landing force by as little time as safety factors permit, we can logically conclude that these atomic weapons will neutralize and destroy the targets which were previously neutralized in the pre-D-Day bombardment.

Many people maintain that the elimination of the pre-D-Day fires

will give the amphibious force an added opportunity to achieve surprise. These individuals believe that the pre-D-Day bombardment of previous years lost the element of surprise, despite the fact that extensive efforts were usually put forth to have 2 or 3 beaches receive similar type shelling. It is our contention, however, that we should not delude ourselves into believing that by eliminating the necessity for pre-D-Day fires we have increased the element of surprise. We must remember that we cannot make this landing until we have achieved local air superiority—and so, the days prior to D-Day will be spent in extensive air operations to win this superiority. These operations unfortunately will lose for us the element of surprise in the same way that the pre-D-Day bombardment lost it for us in WWII.

And so, having generalized about the major changes which we believe will take place in naval gunfire support in a total or limited nuclear war, let us summarize our conclusions.

We believe naval gunfire will be as necessary in a nuclear war as it was in a conventional amphibious landing. And we believe that this



USS Boston—Guided Missile Cruiser


will be so until we can be assured of air support with a continuous, all-weather capability. Even if airplanes with all-weather capability are provided in sufficient numbers, there is serious doubt that it would be economical to employ them for all missions.

Since naval gunfire is considered necessary and since a landing in a wholesale or limited nuclear war takes on different characteristics, certain modifications in naval gunfire support are considered necessary. These changes envision a greater use of cruisers in direct support roles and guided missiles from any ship capable of firing them for general support. Moreover, the pre-D-Day bombardment is considered unnecessary in a war employing atomic weapons.

The Marine Corps realizes that we cannot be certain that our next fight will be an atomic one, and so it must maintain the capability of using naval gunfire in practically the same way it was used during WWII and Korea. The modifications listed above do not preclude us from maintaining that capability.

All in all, we must sum it up this way—the “gravel crunchers” are still dependent on the lethal effects of naval gunfire to help them continue their successful string of amphibious landings, thereby upholding the reputation of the Marine Corps as an elite and professional striking force capable of always landing and having the situation well in hand.

US MC



Regulus Missile aboard carrier



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The Viking Press, NY.

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DANGER IN THE AIR OLIVER STEWART

The author argues that the tendency to hush up air accidents or to treat them from the purely sensational angle is damaging to the development of safe flying. He therefore describes a set of air accidents, each one illustrating some particular kind of danger, and shows how it has been dealt with by engineers, designers and research workers. Thus the tragedies of aviation history are here seen in their true perspective, as stages in the accumulation of technical knowledge and operational understanding.

Philosophical Library, NY.

\$6.00

THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE REPORT ON THE BALLISTIC MISSILE

Edited by LTCOL KENNETH F. GANTZ, USAF

This book makes public the official policies and programs of the USAF concerning the ballistic missile. It describes in detail the nature of the missile, its development and production, its use as a weapon by the Strategic Air Command, and the projected USAF program of space operations which the long-range missile makes possible. The Preface is by Gen Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, USAF, and the Introduction by MajGen Bernard A. Schriever, USAF.

Doubleday & Co., NY.

\$4.00

WAR AND PEACE IN THE SPACE AGE

LTGEN JAMES M. GAVIN

We are now 3 years into what LtGen Gavin calls the Decade of Decision. He says we have allowed the Russians a dangerous military, political and psychological advantage, but that we did not have to. The former Chief of Research and Development for the Army stipulates precisely the military, scientific and technological goals we must achieve for our own defense by 1965.

Harper & Brothers, NY.

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Subtitled "The Critique of a Myth," this volume presents for the first time the original text of the Schlieffen Plan in its entirety. No military mystery has ever aroused more controversy in the pages of history than has the question whether this bold stroke was well or ill-conceived as military strategy. Was the original Schlieffen Plan robbed of its success because those who tried to follow it lacked the courage to take the full risk? Or was it the Plan itself which was at fault? Gerhard Ritter is one of Germany's most distinguished historians. The Introduction is by B. H. Liddell Hart.

Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., NY.

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The setting of this biography covers 2 continents and many nations—from the glitter and pomp of St. James' Palace to a bloody ravine along the faraway banks of the Monongahela. It spans a century (1660-1755) when the world turned upside down. And back and around the tragic central figure, Edward Braddock—grandson of a Gentleman of the Chapel Royal, son of an officer in the Coldstream Guards—move the variety and action and speech of romantic people, caught in their strongest and weakest moments.

Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, Pa.

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JAMES LEASOR

"She is as safe as a house—except for the millionth chance." So spoke Lord Thomson, Secretary of State for Air, before the R101 took off on her fatal flight from England in 1930. He, more than anyone, was responsible for the development of the airship in its battle for supremacy against the airplane after WWI. The author has set out the strange and compelling story of the creation of the great vessel, the race against time for political reasons, the refusal to take notice of sound scientific advice, and the bungling in high places.

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Thomas Nelson & Sons, NY

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HAWTHORNE DANIEL

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Doubleday & Co., NY.

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Marine Corps Gazette • September 1958

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JOHN EDWARD WEEMS

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University of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis, Minn.

\$5.00

THE BLOCKHOUSE

JEAN-PAUL CLEBERT

This novel, a best seller in France, is based on a true incident. It recreates the story of a group of men trapped for 6 years in an underground fortification on the coast of France. As laborers for the German army, the men had taken refuge in the blockhouse to escape the invasion bombardment. When bombs blocked all exits, death seemed imminent until the men found vast quantities of food, clothing, candles, matches and wine—but no water. When after 6 years the rescue finally comes, only 2 of the 6 men are alive.

Coward-McCann, Inc., NY.

\$3.50

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HOWARD H. PECKHAM

This volume is an effort to explain how and why the upset of an American victory in the Revolutionary War was accomplished. Battles fall into campaigns, and campaigns interpret strategy. Commanders are characterized, and flashes of insight illuminate victories and defeats. The book also demonstrates how highly prized were the rights that the revolutionaries sought to confirm or establish and serves as a reminder today that some ideas are worth risking life for.

University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

\$3.50

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GEORGE KENNAN

By sleigh, on horseback and by open-deck riverboat, George Kennan (1845-1924) and his photographer-companion George Frost crossed 8,000 miles of forbidding Siberian wasteland to expose the brutal injustice of the 19th century Tsarist prison camps. This book, famous among a generation of Americans and Europeans after its first publication

in 1891, is the account of that 1885-86 expedition. This new abridged edition of Kennan's book contains 9 of the original illustrations by Frost and an introduction by George F. Kennan, the elder Kennan's nephew.

University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

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This is the first book to describe and analyze comprehensively the world's defenses against international propaganda. The author outlines the elaborate propaganda activities of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States; describes the bewildered reaction of states to early propaganda attempts and the gradual realization that propaganda is a potent weapon; recounts how barrier after barrier of treaties, laws and diplomatic gambits have been thrown up to ward off undesirable propaganda, and speculates on the future.

University of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis, Minn.

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THE FACE OF DEATH

CAPT JACK EVANS

As told to ERNEST DUDLEY

Jack Evans was 16 years old when he joined the RAF. He had been reared in France, narrowly escaped the Nazis which left him desirous to fight on French soil.

A chance meeting, and Evans' life was changed for all time. He was tapped for intelligence work behind the German lines. Just before he was to parachute into France his real age was discovered and he was hustled into the newly formed Commando Corps.

Until he was captured in North Africa, Evans was in on some of Britain's most daring raids. His own active war ended in Stalag III.

William Morrow & Co., NY.

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PASSING IN REVIEW

BAA BAA BLACK SHEEP

GREGORY (PAPPY) BOYINGTON, Col, USMC (Ret). 384 pages. G. P. Putnam's Sons, NY. \$4.50

Many good Marines will contend that this book should never have been written or at least should have been disregarded by the *GAZETTE*, for *Baa Baa Black Sheep* is not the biography of a squadron but the autobiography of a Marine who was rarely at his best—except when the chips were down. In fact, as Boyington tacitly admits, he was a center of controversy throughout his military career. Certainly those who knew him in flight school would have been anything but surprised to see him declared *persona non grata* there—not for lack of aptitude, to be sure, but because he had a nose for trouble and little tolerance for boredom. The veneer of a gentleman was thinner on him than on most. But this is the hallmark of a certain brand of fighter in every age of history. Let's just say Boyington was never a model Marine, except in results—and in his brand of results—victory in the air—he stands alone.

Despite his perverse qualities, Boyington could cooperate when called upon to do so, or talk the enemy into cooperating as this extract indicates:

"The enemy ground-control radio had our frequency and decided to join the little game. They were pretending to be American pilots on a mission in our locality. But we were willing to gamble on just who was going to fox whom.

"Major Boyington, what is your position?" came in as clear as a bell without the slightest trace of an accent. I doubt that I would have recognized some of those American-sounding voices on the radio if they hadn't used such perfect English, or if I hadn't known in this particular case that we were out of range of our own aircraft. . . .

"I played along with the ground

radio and the Japanese who were speaking to me in English. Help from some cloud formations at several different levels made the game of hide-and-seek even more interesting. I was aware that their fighters were in the air and trying to locate bombers.

"Major Boyington, what is your position?"

"Over Treasury Island,' I came back with, which was a short distance southeast of Bougainville, and then told him exactly where we were above the clouds.

"What are your angels, Major Boyington?"

"Twenty angels, repeating, twenty angels."



"I receive you five by five,' which means loud and clear, and then they ceased transmitting. I had lied about my altitude angels, for we were at twenty-five thousand, and were putting an extra grand on for luck while I was talking.

"The next thing I saw, about the most beautiful sight a fighter pilot can dream of, climbing in an easterly direction coming from beneath a white cloud, was a formation of thirty Nippon Zeros. We were fortunate in having the midday sun coming over our shoulders, pointing down in front of us upon the backs of our climbing enemy, which is another thing a fighter pilot desires if possible.

"I recall placing my finger to my lips to caution silence, while throttling back to lose altitude as I tried

to keep in line with the rays of the sun. Whether my signal was passed on visually made no difference, for my boys remained as silent as the little lambs they were. As we eased down, getting closer and closer, a thought that maybe I was hoggish and our prey might get wise ran through my mind. But no. Almost everybody in the squadron got a shot on our first pass."

The struggle for tactical advantage is one common denominator of all battles, large or small, on the ground, in the air or at sea. In ability to create the tactical advantage, Boyington was well above the average cut of pilot, as the incident over the Treasuries clearly shows. But this affair also illustrates a major difference between air and ground combat. Exploiting the tactical advantage on the ground may be a matter of days. Here 12 enemy aircraft were knocked down by Boyington's boys in much less time than it takes to tell it. "... After our return to base I discovered that one of the boys had timed the action with a stop watch, for there was always some guy who had to do the unusual. The entire action, from beginning to end, had taken just thirty seconds."

There are other good lessons in air tactics in this book and not all are of the air to air variety. But the author admits to a certain feeling of uneasiness when, upon occasion, he drew an attack assignment. Between the lines, one can sense an instinctive revulsion to low altitude work, perhaps the feeling a deep sea diver experiences as he is lowered to ever increasing depths. The pressure in air combat increases with the amount of flyable air one has above him.

Greg Boyington had a constitution not of iron nor of steel but possibly ceramic, for in some respects he was a brittle sort. The heat of competition would have cracked a less durable physique. But during the last few weeks of his fighter career, Boyington felt the strange new pressure of being a national hero who needed but one more "kill" to become the leading American ace of all time. When, after a long hiatus his wily tricks brought contact with the enemy, mechanical failure stayed him from victory. Finally, on the day that victory came, so came defeat—and captivity.

What combination of qualities and circumstances makes this sorrowful sequence so typical of Boyington's life? He attributes all his troubles to emotional immaturity, and I suppose that covers the subject generally. Yet, it is hard to link the cynicism of a determined non-conformist with simple immaturity. Too often, I suspect, the playful lark which went sour was attributed to this nebulous excuse while wryly hoping that soon he would become "less immature." The leader of the Blacksheep was, in fact, a smart man, sharp witted, with a sense of humor not always coarse, and well conditioned to combat by his only hobby, an unusually violent form of relaxation—wrestling matches which frequently lasted from sundown to sunup.

The essential raw material for a psychiatrist's doctorate lies between the covers of this book, although Boyington's formative years are covered only by flashbacks. This aspect of the book has particularly interested other reviewers. The narrative begins on the despairing note of a young buck hopelessly in debt who signs as a Flying Tiger mercenary. He comes back to his Marine Corps career bringing priceless combat experience interlarded with disillusionment culled from exotic new fleshpots, broken promises and the first dank taste of Asian jungles. Consistent with the story, his break in the South Pacific is largely the result of doing things the Boyington way. Almost in the combat zone, he seized upon a gap in the flow of replacement units to form a batch of unassigned young fire-eaters into a squadron. These were his "Blacksheep" and he was their "Grandpappy." Their illustrious combat record thereafter is well enough known, but the incidents leading up to Boyington's defeat and his subsequent treatment as a prize POW are fresh additions to the history of WWII.

Baa Baa Blacksheep is the first book to bear the Boyington impress. Because he has managed in this effort to combine a remarkably readable style with a good bit of excellent philosophy, we can hope it's not the last. There are a good many Boyington anecdotes yet to see print.

If Boyington himself won't do it, perhaps they may be written by others.

Reviewed by Col N. J. Anderson

Ed: This reviewer is a Naval Aviator presently assigned to HQMC. He was a classmate of Col Boyington's at Flight School.

SPACEPOWER

DONALD COX and MICHAEL STOIKO. 262 pages, illustrated. N. Stanilla. John C. Winston Co., Phila., Toronto. \$4.50

In a significant article entitled "Reflections on Sea and Space" in *The Saturday Review (Of Literature)* Peter Ritner aptly summed up the present space exploration dilemma when he wrote:

"Admiral Mahan was neither the first nor the last philosopher to realize that new rules make a new game. We Americans are playing today with new cards and for new stakes. Only a generation of gamblers—such as we must again become—can hope to enjoy the game."



Thus authors Donald Cox and Michael Stoiko sagaciously leave the problem of defining the why and wherefore of dominating space to Peter Ritner.

Spacepower is a summary and a forecast of the plans for space travel and conquest in what we must now call The Embryonic Stage. What the future will foretell is a solid practical theory but unfortunately contains an extraordinary amount of good old fashioned guesswork. This would have quite an alarming effect on the individual, particularly if he was suddenly assigned the dubious distinction of visiting the moon within the present IGY year.

Our space traveling scientists will undoubtedly share (along with a full quota of enthusiasm), a great deal of suspect and resulting alertness to deal with the emergencies that seem certain to occur on early sched-

uled space trips or explorations.

Spacepower gives comprehensive definitions along with graphic illustrations of power plants that exist today and contemplates the energies that will have to be utilized in the future. It also delves into the strategic and tactical importance of space vehicles. Rules and regulations are already being suggested . . . i.e. — "The Counterspace Battle requires that an enemy be hit or killed primarily in space and not on the ground." (It seems rather naive to suppose that after devoting the time and efforts it would take to literally get out of this world into battle, an enemy would be spared because of his 2 feet occupying a small lot on terra-firma). However, laws of space will have to be attempted no matter how uncooperative an aggressor country might prove to be.

Histrionics of the Soviets' Great Surge in the Missile field, after a very late start, prove very interesting. Shortly before the capture of Peenemunde, in the final phases of WWII, just about every military assignee of any stature knew that Germany, for all her military failures, was far ahead of all countries in guided missile development and application. The Soviets were successful, by devious means, in procuring some 5,000 scientists, engineers, and technicians from the Peenemunde project. The US grabbed a few select scientists also, but most assuredly, came out a weak "also ran," to the Soviet acquisitions.

If you are a reader who desires to keep up with the space timetable, then *Spacepower* should get you off to a good start.

Co-author Donald Cox is a WWII veteran of China, Burma and India as a weather observer for the USAAF. He possesses a BA from Montclair State Teachers College and matriculated at Columbia University for his doctorate in education. Mr. Cox has an extensive teaching background with such as the Air Command and Staff College in Montgomery, Alabama.

Co-author Michael Stoiko is a native of New York City. A veteran of 5 years with the Marines in the Pacific Theater he has a well founded accumulation of knowledge starting with his early enthusiasm for aircraft design, structure and maintenance. He completed his academic

training at Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn and worked for General Electric on the A-3 project Hermes missile. An author of many technical articles in aviation magazines, he is a member of the American Rocket Society and the British Interplanetary Society.

Reviewed by MSgt J. C. DeGrasse

Ed: The reviewer has been interested in space travel and missiles since the latter part of WWII. He is currently stationed at MCS, Quantico.

THE NEW CLASS

MILOVAN DJILAS. 214 pages. F. A. Prager, New York, NY. \$3.95

Milovan Djilas' *The New Class* is a small book carrying a heavy punch.

The author's heavily freighted phrases and detailed recapitulation of the dialectic of Marx, Hegel, et al. may provide tough going for those accustomed to less rigorous fare; for hardy souls of an inquiring turn, this book is a must.

Former Vice President of Yugoslavia Milovan Djilas presents an analysis of the communist system that is detailed, rare and powerful . . . detailed by 30 years of revolutionary activity as statesman, theoretician and guerrilla, rare because Djilas had nothing to gain (but the satisfaction of speaking his mind) and everything to lose, and powerful because it is authoritative.

The book is not a refutation of


the conclusions reached by Marxism-Leninism. It rather points out the consequences of those conclusions, and we are left once more with Lord Acton's famed dictum that power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

The author's analysis: Communism has failed to make any society classless. It has succeeded only in creating the illusion of a classless society; the dedicated communist persists in illusions and unrealizable ideals. Communism has not abolished the ownership of production. What is ownership, if not the right of profit and control? Since control now belongs to the Communist Party, there is now merely a new form of ownership, a new ruling . . . and exploiting class, a bureaucracy that has all the characteristics of previous classes.

Here is a man asserting his right to intellectual liberty and his country's right to freedom from government of the new elite, by the new elite, and for the new elite . . . the Roman Empire had the patricians, feudalism had its nobility, and communism has the Party. The development of this new class has been the development of the status of the Party leaders: Marx died a humble and poor London immigrant, Lenin a respected leader, and Stalin a god, "the symbol of the difficult, cruel, and unscrupulous ascent of the new class to its final power."

And so, page by page, chapter by chapter, Milovan Djilas hammers out his granite logic that soon makes it evident that communism is no more altruistic, infallible, or honest than Tammany Hall. But there is a note of tragedy here: in this dissection of the communist anatomy, Djilas is also performing a post-mortem on the major part of his own life. No human being does this sort of thing with ease, and whatever becomes of Milovan Djilas, once-honored patriot, now prisoner, it is to his everlasting credit that he possessed the courage to stand up and say to his friends: "You are wrong."

History has yet to judge his significance, yet when the final story of free men is written, Milovan Djilas will certainly be regarded as the noblest Yugoslav of them all, whose "life was gentle, and the elements so



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mix'd in him that Nature might stand up and say to all the world, THIS WAS A MAN!"

Reviewed by Maj David Riley

Ed: Presently assigned as OpOfficer, Air Section, MCLFDC, MCS, Quantico, Maj Riley wrote "French Helicopter Operations in Algeria" (GAZETTE: Feb '58).

I SAW FOR MYSELF

ANTHONY NUTTING. 103 pages. Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, NY. \$3.00

Late in 1956 when British troops parachuted into the Suez Canal Zone, Anthony Nutting was British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. In disagreement with Anglo-French intervention at Suez, Mr. Nutting resigned his post and decided to "see for himself" what could be done to improve relations between his country and the Arab world. *I Saw For Myself* is a clear, concise and candid report of his observations.

To gain a better understanding of the Middle East and her people, the author travelled some 20,000 miles through 18 countries of this restless area where he talked with politicians and peasants, diplomats and students, oil-men and tribal chieftains. Among the better-known leaders with whom he discussed problems of the Middle East were King Faisal of Iraq, King Hussein of Jordan, King Saud, President Nasser, Premier Nehru, Nuri-es-Said of Iraq, Ben Gurion of Israel, President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon, Iskander Mirza of Pakistan, Premier Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, Ben Halim of Libya, Si Bekkai of Morocco, and Al Assali of Syria.

What the rulers, statesmen, and people of these countries told him and his analysis of their statements are woven country by country into a picture of the fundamental issues which continue to foment trouble in this disturbed area.

As seen by Mr. Nutting, the only lasting solution to Middle Eastern problems is a union of Arab states in which the best interests of the Moslem people transcend differences of nationality. Nasser has become a popular hero to the Moslem masses with promises of a united and great Arab world. The West, however, has many friends among the Moslem countries; and if the West helps these nations to grow into a strong and economically-integrated confederation, the friendship of a new

great power in world politics will have been gained.

Each country of North Africa and the Middle East is discussed in a separate chapter of *I Saw For Myself*. Typical of the manner in which the book is written are some of the observations in the chapter on Algeria. Here Mr. Nutting says of the respective issues, "There are prodigious French investments in Algeria which Paris fears would be sequestered if the nationalists got the power to lay hands on them. Even more important than this is the recent oil strike in the Algerian Sahara. The French see two heaven-sent prospects in this vitally important discovery. First, they believe that the oil will pay for the war in Algeria, and second, so great is the strike, that they fancy they will soon be independent of Middle East oil and all its problems. . . .

"The Algerian people will never admit the fantastic proposition that they and their land are a part of France. On either side of them they have the example of Morocco and

Tunisia— independent States which won their independence after much bloodshed and conflict. Even in Black Africa they know that a far greater degree of autonomy has been granted to the local population than they have ever known in Algeria. With this knowledge of what can be won by keeping up the pressure and keeping on with the fight, the Algerian people will never rest until they too have won their independence."

Though originally formulated during his tour of North Africa and the Middle East early in 1957, Mr. Nutting's impressions remain as valid today as the day they were formed. The currency of the impressions and conclusions, as well as the clear and concise manner of presentation, makes the reading of *I Saw For Myself* well worthwhile for a better understanding of current events in an area of more than casual interest to Marines.

Reviewed by LtCol K. C. Houston

Ed: A student of current events, LtCol Houston is stationed at MCS, Quantico, Va.

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MCRDep, San Diego

Col B. A. Hochmuth

MCB, Camp Lejeune

Maj C. E. Faser

MARPAC, San Francisco

Maj W. K. Zaudtke

MCAS, Cherry Point

Capt E. C. McCarthy

MCAS, Miami

1st Lt C. R. Venditto

MCAS, El Toro

Maj J. D. Mitchell

MCAS, Quantico

Capt G. A. Corliss

MCAS, Kaneohe

Capt G. B. Stevens

MCAAS, Mojave

Capt R. A. Seaver

MCSC, Barstow

LtCol W. H. Robinson, Jr.

MCSC, Albany

Capt J. R. Langley, Jr.

Marine Barracks, DC

Maj J. C. McIntosh

MARTCOM

Maj R. N. Dixon

1st MCRRD

Capt C. J. Gilroy, Jr.

4th MCRRD

LtCol A. A. Poindexter

5th MCRRD

Capt R. E. Haebel

6th MCRRD

LtCol J. W. Stevens II

2d Pioneer Bn

2d Lt T. F. Broughton

HQ Bn, 2d Mar Div

Capt W. A. Bandyk

8th MCRRD

1st Lt J. E. Kussmann

9th MCRRD

LtCol W. E. Lunn

10th MCRRD

Col G. R. Long

12th MCRRD

LtCol A. D. Cereghino

14th MCRRD

Capt T. S. Brown

MB, Great Lakes

1st Lt C. S. Ames

MB, Kwajalein

1st Lt D. R. Christensen

MB, Atsugi

Maj R. G. Demaree

MB, NAD, Oahu

Capt E. Hunt

MB, Sasebo

WO G. J. Decaro

MB, Guam

Capt V. T. Blaz

MB, FA, Yokosuka

Maj S. E. Kramek

MB, Norfolk

1st Lt W. R. Stendahl

MB, Clarksville

Capt J. C. Hergert

Camp Smedley D. Butler

Col J. S. Skoczylas

2d Depot Sup Bn

Maj C. F. Dizney

MACS 9

2d Lt C. A. Yates

1st Bn, 10th Marines

Maj T. J. Holt

VMF (AW) 115

2d Lt D. D. Wilson

HMR (L) - 161

Capt J. C. Robinson

MWHC, 3d MAW

2d Lt A. C. Risoli

1st MAW, FPO

Maj R. D. Morris

VMA 332

1st Lt R. W. King

HQ, MAG 11

Maj G. J. King

MAG (HR) (L) - 16

Maj P. Weidenkeller

HMR (L) 163

1st Lt C. E. Dorffeld

HQ, Marine Air T & RC

Maj L. B. Dochterman

HQ, MWSC 17

Capt E. J. Degennaro

HMR (L) - 361

2d Lt J. E. Carroll

H & MS 33

Capt D. C. Alexander

VMA 214

Capt W. W. Campbell

7th Auto Wpns Btry

Capt A. Tatusko

11th Inf Bn

Capt R. H. Icke

Capt R. B. Vawter

72d Inf Co

Capt F. M. McCurdy, Jr.

4th Bn, 10th Marines

Maj A. E. Coffeen

3d Bn, 10th Marines

Maj R. J. Randolph

1st Bn, 2d Marines

Maj F. V. Moise

Prize Essay Contest

\$2,000

CLASSIFICATIONS

- Group I: Field Grade Officers; Civilians**
- Group II: Company Grade Officers**
- Group III: Enlisted**
- Group IV: Members of the Platoon Leaders Class, Marine Corps Option NROTC, Officer Candidates Class and NAVCADs.**

(Prospective officers may enter Group IV if they have not received their commission at the time the essay is submitted.)

A total of \$2,000.00 will be awarded to the winners of the Marine Corps Association's 1958 Prize Essay Contest. Essays will be judged in the 4 classifications, determined by the status of the contestant (active, inactive or retired member of the Armed Forces of the US and its Allies or as a civilian). A prize of \$500.00 will be awarded to the winner in each group. If no essay entered in the contest is of a sufficiently high standard of excellence, no prize will be awarded in the classification concerned. In the event of a tie, awards may be prorated.

Material dealing with original thinking on military subjects is particularly desired. Historical essays are not solicited unless they can point up some development or far-reaching thought that affects us directly today.

In addition to the prizes awarded, one or more essays may receive "Honorable Mention" and be accepted for publication. Those not receiving a prize or honorable mention may be accepted for general publication in the GAZETTE. Compensation for such articles will be as adjudged by the Editorial Board.

General Rules

1. Contestants may write on any subject of military interest but essays may not exceed 5,000 words and they must be original.
2. They must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8 x 11, and must be submitted in triplicate.
3. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each essay heading shall contain an identifying phrase consisting of the last 5 words of the essay. This phrase shall appear:
 - a) On the title page of the essay.
 - b) On the outside of a sealed envelope containing the name (rank and serial number, if any) of the author.
 - c) Above the name and address of the author, inside the identifying envelope.
4. Essays and identifying envelope must be mailed in a sealed envelope marked Prize Essay Contest Group (I, II, III, IV as appropriate) to the Secretary-Treasurer, Marine Corps Association, Box 1844, Quantico, Virginia.
5. Essays must be received by the Secretary-Treasurer prior to 1 October 1958.

The copyright of any essay which appears in the GAZETTE is the property of the Marine Corps Association. No liability for the loss, return, judging or reports on any essay submitted will be assumed by the Marine Corps Association or the GAZETTE and the decisions of the Editorial Board will be final. No inquiries regarding essays will be answered until final judgment has been made.

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